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Abstract
This thesis operationalizes and tests a new theoretical framework of how to map populist radical
right voters in the political space. While such research has been dominated by two-dimensional
frameworks, the framework of this thesis is three-dimensional as proposed by Kitschelt in recent
work.
To be able to operationalize the new three-dimensional framework the thesis is based on
thorough review of both the dominant two-dimensional and the newer theories regarding political
dimensions and the populist radical right. The theories were then applied to find the best
suiting variables from the European Social Survey 2012 to represent the values constituting the
three-dimensional political space.
The re-theorized framework has never before been empirically tested. The evidence presented
in this thesis suggest that the voting patterns of the populist radical right voters are different
on these three dimensions. This supports Kitschelt’s argument in that we ought to consider the
political space as three-dimensional. By using three dimensions this thesis was able to capture
important variation in how populist radical right voters can be placed in the political space.
This thesis has discovered the presence of an important issue that does not fit into the three-
dimensional political framework. The gay rights-issue represents values that are different from
the ones constituting the three dimension. Neither Kitschelt nor I could have expected these
results.
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1Introduction
1.1 Political dimensions and the populist radical right
Explaining the populist radical right (PRR), their breakthrough, their success and their political
impact, have been both a challenging and popular task for scholars over the last three decades.
The success of the populist radical right parties have attracted major attention. The debate
concerns definitional disputes about the party family, what the consequences will be when the
parties reach government, who vote for them, their uniqueness, their impact on democracy, and
much more.
One topic of the research on populist radical right parties has been on how these parties and
their voters can be placed in the competitive political space. In this political space, political
parties can both rise and demise (Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi, Grande,
Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, and Frey 2008). Many scholars have used political dimensions to
help explain the success of the populist radical right parties, e.g. Bornschier (2010ab); Kitschelt
and McGann (1995); Kriesi et al. (2008). Up until recently, scholars have agreed that there
are two solid political dimensions: one cultural and one socio-economic (Bornschier 2010ab;
Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008). This thesis contributes to
the debate by presenting evidence from comparative voting analyses, which challenges the
dominant two-dimensional account. The results found in this thesis are based on Kitschelt’s
(2012) re-theorization of the political space.
Kitschelt’s seminal study of the transformation of European social democracy is built on
the traditional two-dimensional framework ranging from a cultural libertarian–authoritarian
pole to an economic socialist–capitalist pole (Kitschelt and McGann 1995: 15). He argues that
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populist radical right parties are mainly placed alongside the economic capitalist and cultural
authoritarian poles. Although Kitschelt’s work is of great importance for understanding both
party competition, the development of political parties and voter preferences, his work from the
1990’s is in need of modification (de Lange 2007; Ivarsflaten 2005). In this respect Kitschelt
himself has introduced an improvement of the structure of the political space (Kitschelt 2012).
Kitschelt’s re-theorization of the political space started with the major breakthrough of the
populist radical right party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Dutch national election of 2002. The
leader of the party, Pim Fortuyn, argued that immigration, and especially Islam, challenged
the very foundations of liberal democracy, e.g gender equality, freedom of expression, Western
traditions and gay rights. The combination of values that brought upon the success of the LPF
cannot be explained by the traditional two-dimensional framework. Kitschelt (2012: 241-244)
argues that the cultural- and socio-economic dimensions are not enough to explain and analyze
voter preferences, especially regarding populist radical right parties after the success of the LPF.
The re-theorization of the theoretical framework splits the cultural libertarian–authoritarian
dimension into two separate dimensions: one containing group-issues (immigration, ethnicity,
European integration) and one containing traditional libertarian versus authoritarian issues (law
and order, gender equality, gay rights). This re-theorized theoretical framework has never before
been operationalized or empirically tested. This thesis sets out to do exactly that, with an
exclusive focus on the voters of populist radical right parties in contemporary Western European
democracies. For this thesis, I put forth the following research question:
Can the new three-dimensional political space outlined by Kitschelt in recent work, better
explain populist radical right voting patterns than the existing and dominant two-dimensional
frameworks?
The thesis sets out to explain and compare the different political dimensions that constitute
voter preferences to the populist radical right parties in contemporary Western European democ-
racies. The thesis will operationalize the re-theorized theoretical framework outlined by Kitschelt
(2012), and test if this three-dimensional framework can better explain the populist radical right
voting patterns. In order to do this I focus first on the traditional theories of the political space by
Kitschelt (1994); Kitschelt and McGann (1995); Kriesi et al. (2008) and Bornschier (2010ab).
2
1.2 Justifying the thesis
This thesis has two main contributions. First of all I will operationalize the issues belonging to the
three dimensions. This operationalization is based on thorough reviews of both classic and newer
theories regarding the dominant two-dimensional framework, the re-theorized three-dimensional
framework and the populist radical right. I also use the cultural theories of grid and group as
suggested by Kitschelt (2007; 2012). I then apply these theories to find the best suiting variables
from the European Social Survey 2012 to represent the values constituting the three-dimensional
political space.
The second contribution of this thesis is the empirical testing of this exact theoretical
framework. Kitschelt (2012) introduced a re-theorized theoretical framework consisting of three
dimensions to distinguish voters of the populist radical right. The framework has never before
been empirically tested. The results will be tested with both binary and multinomial logistic
regression analysis. The binary analysis combines all countries in a straight comparative voting
analysis, while the multinomial analysis examines each country in order to be able to discover
cross-country differences.
If Kitschelt (2012) is right about needing to consider the political space as three-dimensional
when doing research on the populist radical right, this will give important suggestions for future
research.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
Chapter two will present and discuss the theoretical framework. The chapter starts by discussing
the definition of parties chosen for this thesis. I then present the classical theories of political
dimensions and discuss each author’s perspective of the structure of the political space. After this,
I present the background for re-theorizing the political space before presenting the re-theorized
three-dimensional framework. Finally, I present the content of each of the three dimensions
constituting the political space along with my hypotheses.
Chapter three presents the data and methodological choices of this thesis. In this chapter I
evaluate my methodological choices as well as explaining why the European Social Survey 2012
was chosen to represent the data foundation of the thesis.
In chapter four the operationalization of the three-dimensional political space is presented.
Each concept is thoroughly discussed according to the theories. In addition to the theoretical
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foundation of the three concepts, I test if the variables that have been outlined to constitute
each concept actually belong together, using principal components analysis. The results from
principal components analysis are being used to create indices of each dimension.
In chapter five I present the results from the analysis. First, the indices that was created
based on the theoretical operationalization of the three dimensions is tested with binary logistic
regression analysis. After this, the results from each country is presented. The separate country
analysis is estimated with multinomial logistic regression analysis. This analysis compares the
populist radical right voters with the voters of the other major parties in each country.
The final chapter presents the discussion of the results based on the three-dimensional
political space. In this chapter I answer the hypotheses as well as the general research question.
Finally, I summarize the contributions of the thesis and give suggestions for future research.
4
2Theoretical framework
In this chapter I put forward the theoretical framework constituting the foundation of the
thesis. In the first section I present an overview of definitional disputes as well as emphasize
and defend my own choice of definition and case selection. The next section presents an
overview of the literature of political dimensions structuring the political space, as well as
populist radical right parties. I first present an overview of the dominant two-dimensional
frameworks. The two-dimensional frameworks are important for two main reasons. First of
all to understand Kitschelt’s re-theorization, and second to be able to operationalize the new
re-theorized framework. Thereafter, the re-theorization of the theoretical framework is presented.
Finally, I present my main hypotheses.
2.1 Definition of parties
An important debate of populist radical right parties is how to classify them. Kitschelt and
McGann (1995: 35) distinguishes between four different types of right-wing parties. Fascist
parties, welfare chauvinist parties, new radical right parties and populist antistatist parties.
Right-wing parties have been defined in many different ways. They have been classified as
Extreme Right parties (Ignazi 1992; Lubbers et al. 2002), Populist Radical Right parties (Mudde
2007), Radical Right-Wing Populists (Betz 1994), Anti-Immigrant parties (van der Brug et al.
2000) and many more.
I have chosen to use the label populist radical right (PRR) to classify the party family. The
labels populism, radical and right are important contributors to these parties ideologies and
characteristics. Populism is an ideology and rhetoric used to separate the pure people from the
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corrupt elite (Mudde 2007: 23; Rydgren 2007). Other groups such as immigrants and ethnic
minorities are also commonly excluded from the pure people (Rydgren 2007: 245). A common
feature of parties in the populist ideology is that they strategically oppose the political class,
criticizing other established parties, while at the same time trying not to appear anti-democratic
(Rydgren 2007). The populist rhetoric of these parties can even be used in a way that makes
these parties appear as the true democratic defenders (Betz and Johnson 2004: 312).
Radical is a term often connected to the term extreme (Rydgren 2007). The populist radical
right party family are considered a radical party family, and sometimes even extreme, because
they reject pluralist values. Even though they accept a liberal democracy, their ideal is an
ethnically homogeneous society not compatible with pluralist values (Rydgren 2007: 243). Their
ideal society is an ethnocracy, where democracy has been redefined and adjusted to an ethnic
homogeneous group (Minkenberg 2000: 181). Givens (2005) uses the term Radical Right to
classify the party family. She argues that the term nationalism is of exceptional importance for the
party family. In addition to nationalism, she argues that the party family also have two features
in common: an anti-immigrant policy strategy as well as being anti-establishment parties1.
The term right is now commonly associated with positions on socio-economic issues (Ry-
dgren 2007: 243). Kitschelt and McGann (1995) argue that parties can be classified in the
radical right category if they have discovered the winning formula. The winning formula is
the combination of market-liberal and authoritarian right values. Both Rydgren (2007) and
Minkenberg (2000) disagrees with the classification of parties based on the winning formula.
They argue that populist radical right parties are mainly concerned with cultural issues and that
they employ market liberal values more as a tactical tool, but not as one of their main concerns.
A common way for creating classifications is by analyzing ideologies (Ennser 2010). Mudde
(2007) classifies PRR-parties using three distinctive ideologies: nativism, authoritarianism and
populism. The term populistm has already been discussed above. Amongst the three, nativism is
held to be of exceptional importance (Mudde 2007). In the nativist ideology countries should be
inhabited exclusively by one native group: the true nation. Non-members of this native group are
considered threatening towards the homogeneous society (Mudde 2007: 19). In this perspective,
immigrants and other unfamiliar cultural groups are regarded as threats towards nationalism. The
third element, authoritarianism, is an ideology believing in a strictly ordered society with strict
laws, and where insubordination towards authorities will be punished severely (Mudde 2007:
1Anti-establishment parties consider themselves as outsiders of the party system and therefore unaffected by the
government and other parties (Givens 2005: 20).
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23). Authoritarians are concerned with laws and the justice system trying to create a safe society
protected from criminals and disobedient individuals.
Table 2.1 represents three commonly used classifications of populist radical right parties.
These are the classifications by Mudde (2007; 2012), Kitschelt and McGann (1995) and Golder
(2003). The parties presented in table 2.1 represents the major parties classified as populist
radical right in Western Europe. The table also includes the two most recent successful parties:
Sverigedemokraterna (SD) in Sweden and Perussuomalaiset (PS) in Finland. Sverigedemokra-
terna won 5.7 percent of the vote in the Swedish general election in 2010 and overcame the
electoral threshold. In the Finnish general election in 2011, Perussuomalaiset won a substantial
share of the vote (19.1 percent). Scholars have overall agreed in classifying Sverigedemokraterna
as belonging to the populist radical right party family (Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen 2012: 1).
The classification of Perussuomalaiset is somewhat more controversial, because the PS advances
a number of issues as equally important to the immigration issue, such as linguistic issues
(Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen 2012: 1).
Table 2.1: A definitional chart of PRR-parties in Western Europe
Country Party Mudde Kitschelt Golder
(2007, 2012) (1995) (2003)
Austria Freiheitlieche Partei O¨sterreichs (FPO¨) PRR Populist Antistatist Populist
Belgium Vlaams Belang (VB) PRR - Populist
Front national (Belge)(FNb) PRR - Populist
Denmark Dansk Folkeparti (DF) PRR - Populist
Finland Perussuomalaiset (PS) - - -
France Front National (FN) PRR New Radical Right Populist
Germany Die Republikaner (REP) PRR Populist Antistatist Populist
Italy Lega Nord (LN) - - Populist
Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) Neo. Populist - -
Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV) PRR - -
Norway Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) Neo. Populist New Radical Right Populist
Sweden Sverigedemokraterna (SD) PRR - -
Switzerland Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) PRR New Radical Right -
The table represents a definitional chart of populist radical right parties in Western European
democracies. I have included three different classifications of these parties. It is clear from these
classifications that new populist radical right parties have risen since Kitschelt and McGann
(1995) and Golder (2003) wrote their classifications. Perussuomalaiset (PS) in Finland and
Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) in Norway are the only parties included in my analysis not classified as
the populist radical right by Mudde (2007; 2012). Mudde (2007) argues that these parties do
not have a consistently nativist appeal and therefore cannot be classified as the populist radical
right. Both Kitschelt and McGann (1995) and Golder (2003) classifiy FrP as a new radical right
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party and a populist party. FrP itself strongly rejects similarities with other populist radical right
parties and also collaborations with such parties (Hagelund 2003: 47).
The most important concept of the PS is true Finnishness- Finland for the true Finns (Arter
2010). The manifesto of the PS also express that they are a party for the people and that they trust
and listen to the people (Arter 2010: 490). According to Arter (2010) the PS should be classified
as a populist radical right party. The classification used in this thesis is an open definition. The
empirical analysis of this thesis will discover if the voting patterns are substantially different in
the cases of Norway and Finland.
Jungar and Jupska˚s (2014) used electoral manifestos to classify the parties studied in a
two-dimensional political space on an economic left/right dimension and a sociocultural libertar-
ian/authoritarian dimension. Their empirical study concludes that the PS should be included in
the populist radical right party family. Interestingly, they also conclude that the FrP should be
treated more carefully when studied as the populist radical right. When considering the political
space as three-dimensional, as I will do in the analysis to follow, I reach the opposite conclusion.
Only seven of the thirteen parties presented in table 2.1 is included in the final analysis of this
thesis. First of all, to obtain reliable results, it is crucial that the parties that are being examined
have support from a certain amount of voters. The basic threshold is 5 percent. Following this
threshold excludes the Die Republikaner from the analysis. In addition, Italy, France and Austria
do not have data present in the European Social Survey 2012 and can therefore not be included
in the empirical analysis2. Lastly, the Belgian case is a special one. Having two party systems
has also resulted in two populist radical right parties. For the Belgian case only the Flemish
voters are included in the further analysis.
2.2 Supply vs. demand
One debate concerning populist radical right parties is how to theorize them. What theories are
the best? Which theories explain the most? This debate is between demand- and supply side
theories. The choice of demand or supply has been a matter of taste and topic. Where demand
side theories focus on changes and developments in values, interests, attitudes and preferences of
PRR-voters, supply side theories concentrate on party programs, party organization and political
opportunities of populist radical right parties, and the parties themselves (Rydgren 2007: 247).
2Detailed argumentation of the chosen survey can be found in section 3.3.
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Populist radical right parties mobilize individuals to vote for them. The goal of this thesis
is to examine voting patterns of populist radical right voters in a three-dimensional political
space in Western Europe. Some of the important theories of this thesis have both supply- and
demand side perspectives. The demand side theories tend to concentrate on ethnic competition,
winners and losers of modernization, political discontent and protest-voting (Rydgren 2007).
Immigration and the protection of national values have been recognized as one of the most
important factors for PRR-voting in previous research (Ivarsflaten 2008; Rydgren 2008; Lubbers,
Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002). The focus of this thesis is on voters and therefore on demand
side theories.
2.3 The dimensionality of the political space
Kitschelt and Kriesi et al. have different perceptions concerning the emergence and structure
of the political space. They do however agree that there are two main political dimensions, one
cultural and one economic. The content of the political dimensions is different in some ways and
will be elaborated in this section of the theory chapter.
Knudsen (1989) presents a discussion of different approaches for identifying cleavage
dimensions. Knudsen (1989) argues that the given structure of a cleavage is expected to produce
separate dimensions. This is because different cleavages cut across each other creating space for
parties to be placed along opposing poles. For instance, Knudsen explains that on the economic
left–right dimension where one can expect a clear separation between socialist and capitalist
parties, the traditional determinants for the placement on this dimension are the cleavage variables
of social class, or education and income (Knudsen 1989: 500). Aardal (1994) argues that it is
important to separate between issues and cleavages. Cleavages vary over time with regards to
salience (Aardal 1994: 226). An issue, can be important in one election and diminish in the next.
This thesis examines the dimensionality of the political space with regards to populist radical
right voters. The concept of each dimension is constituted by different issues that are important
for explaining its structure and the opposing poles.
In the following sections I will first discuss the dominant two-dimensional accounts. The
dominant two-dimensional framework by Kitschelt (1994) and Kitschelt and McGann (1995)
is discussed first. Second I discuss the two-dimensional framework by Kriesi et al. (2008) and
then the framework by Bornschier (2010a). The two-dimensional accounts are important to
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understand Kitschelt’s re-theorization. In addition, the contents of the two-dimensional accounts
is necessary to be able to operationalize the re-theorized three-dimensional framework. Finally, I
will elaborate on the new three-dimensional account by Kitschelt (2012).
2.3.1 From libertarian–authoritarian to socialist–capitalist
The theoretical framework by Kitschelt (1994: 9) is inspired by the slogan of the French
revolution: liberty, equality and fraternity. The slogan represents three ultimate values identified
by the majority of citizens. These values are reflected through social institutions. The value of
liberty is fostered by the marketplace, using free exchange among individuals. Uniting liberty
with equality depends on some sort of allocation, e.g. majority voting or a fair leader which
promotes equality (Kitschelt 1994: 9). Kitschelt (1994: 9) argues that equality and liberty are
both complementary and contradictory values. For example, people who prefer liberty over
equality tend to promote market institutions, while people who prefer equality over liberty
promote political mechanisms for redistribution (Kitschelt 1994: 9). Kitschelt refers to these two
alternatives as liberal capitalism and socialism.
The third value, fraternity, constitutes an independent dimension which crosses the dimension
of equality and liberty. Kitschelt (1994: 9) refers to fraternity as belonging in a communitarian
social order with face-to-face contact and shared norms. Kitschelt refers to these citizens as
communitarians. Communitarians are divided between equality and liberty for the sake of
fraternity. They do not approve of the domination of markets and organizations, but call for
interaction with citizens and promotes common goals and rules (Kitschelt 1994: 9–10).
Figure 2.1 represents the relationship between the ultimate values of liberty, equality and
fraternity, and social organization. The corner marked libertarian socialism blends fraternity
and socialist demands. Kitschelt (1994: 11) argues that this vision entails organizations and
communities with self-managing workers. The corner marked libertarian capitalism calls for
free market exchange and free organization of individuals. The corner marked authoritarian
capitalism represents traditional and hierarchical communitarian integration, e.g. church au-
thority, militarism and patriarchy. These are all important features for free market capitalism
(Kitschelt 1994: 11). The final corner marked authoritarian socialism, represents redistribution
of resources along with hierarchical principles and social order.
What has now been outlined above can only be described as the ultimate values of Kitschelt’s
theoretical framework. An in-depth outline of the typology and political ideology of the ultimate
10
Figure 2.1: The ultimate values structuring social organization
values would require too many pages of this thesis, but I will devote a few pages presenting the
main arguments of Kitschelt’s theoretical framework.
Political preferences of individuals are shaped by a variety of experiences, beliefs and pro-
cesses. Kitschelt (1994) refers to Katznelson (1986) in the process of his theoretical framework.
Katznelson (1986) has developed a framework for the formation of social classes.3 Kitschelt
(1994: 13) argues that the framework of Katznelson is useful for reconstructing the emergence
of political preferences over the economic and cultural dimensions. Kitschelt (1994) discusses a
variety of different variables and factors which can affect individuals’ placement on the two polit-
ical dimensions. Examples of such variables are the divide between public and private, domestic
and international, work experience, work situation, education, organizational experience, family
structure, age, gender and so on. These are all factors and variables which Kitschelt highlights as
important for formation of political preferences and placement on the political dimensions.
Kitschelt (1994) has developed a theoretical framework concerning preference formation
and people’s political dispositions on the two political dimensions: the socio-economic and the
cultural. Each of the two political dimensions have two political axis. Kitschelt (1994: 11)
has named the axis of the economic dimension, socialist–capitalist, and the axis of the cultural
3See Katznelson (1986: 14–21) for more information.
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dimension, libertarian–authoritarian. The content of each of the variables mentioned above can
be outlined and used to understand the content and structure of the different dimensions. For
example, Kitschelt (1994: 15) explains some of the placements according to markets. In the
sense of the public and private sector, employees in the public sector are much less exposed to
competition and pressure of the marketplace. While employees in the private sector are exposed
to higher competition and more focus on profitability. In this way, private employees and business
owners may be more opposed to redistributive policies as well as taxation. Market experiences
are characterized by both relations of property, employees and the location of production.
Such structures affect the self-interests of individuals (Kitschelt 1994: 15–16). Also, the work
environment of individuals can contribute to their personal satisfaction and happiness (Kitschelt
1994: 16). Kitschelt (1994: 16) argues that the situation of people’s work environment primarily
influence their preferences on the cultural libertarian–authoritarian dimension and not the
economic socialist–capitalist dimension. Kitschelt’s argument is that some work environments
offer work independence, creativeness and communicative reinforcement, while other work
environments do not, and in addition have a greater focus on monetary earnings. A creative and
independent work environment encourages workers to be more active in participation which also
influence their political participation (Kitschelt 1994: 16–17).
Another important indicator that may affect people’s political preferences along the two
political dimensions is education. Kitschelt (1994: 17) argues that an individual’s level of
education is highly connected with their work environment. Individuals with higher education
often have greater control of their work environment with greater opportunities for independence,
creativeness and communicative reinforcements. Less educated individuals are typically more
authoritarian, while higher educated individuals typically prefer a more libertarian community.
Gender is also argued to have an indirect effect on political preferences through work
experience and education (Kitschelt 1994: 18). This is because women are often employed in
organizations working with people and symbols.4 Gender itself does not have any direct effect
on political preferences on the libertarian–authoritarian axis of competition. In this respect, age
should be taken into account (Kitschelt 1994: 29). Age and life-style are factors that affect
people’s political preferences. Kitschelt (1994: 19) argues that people who have lived their
lives in standard households are the ones that are least likely to support libertarian values on the
4Working with symbols is characterized as working with health care, social work, counselling and communication.
This type of work involves interpretation of personal competence and individuality and is characterized with more
left-libertarian preferences of politics (Kitschelt 1993: 304)
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socio-cultural dimension, while individuals who have not lived most of their life in a standard
household are more likely to prefer libertarian values and oppose authoritarian values.
Figure 2.2 represents the political dimensions of social democracy structured by occupational
groups as explained above. The socialist–capitalist axis represents the economic dimension of
Kitschelt’s theoretical framework. At one extreme, the socialist pole represents full governmental
intervention in the economy. The capitalist pole represents a minimum of governmental inter-
vention in the economy. The socialist pole is characterized by individuals working in the public
sector with little or no competition from the outside, and an independent work situation. The
capitalist pole is characterized by individuals working in the private sector with great competition
from the local and international market.
Figure 2.2: Political ideologies and occupational groups: The competitive dimensions of
social democracy
Kitschelt (1994) argues that the political competition has shifted from the socialist–capitalist
and libertarian–authoritarian towards the angled line in figure 2.2. The angled line represents
the connection between the socio-cultural and economic political dimensions. In Kitschelt and
McGann’s opinion, the combination of capitalist and authoritarian appeals is what constitutes
the ideal-typical voter of the populist radical right (Kitschelt and McGann 1995: 19).
At the socialist extreme, a large public sector characterized by universal welfare policies
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and redistributive politics are typical features. At the capitalist extreme, a small public sec-
tor characterized by limited welfare resources and limited redistribution are typical features
(Kitschelt 1994). The cultural dimension is represented by the libertarian–authoritarian axis.
The libertarian–authoritarian axis can be explained by the concept of hierarchy (Stubager 2008:
328). A position at the libertarian pole involves values against social hierarchy. This means a
free and equal interaction between individuals with a minimum of governmental restrictions.
Examples of issues located at the libertarian pole are: support of immigration, recommendation
of pro-environmental policies and encouragement of gay rights. A position at the authoritarian
pole involves values supportive of social hierarchy. This means that some individuals are superior
to others. Such values call for a maximum of governmental restrictions. Examples of issues
located at the authoritarian extreme are: opposition towards immigration, restrictions against gay
marriage and other alternative ways of living, support of a strict society with tough incentives
against crime, as well as low concerns for environmental issues (Kitschelt 1994; Stubager 2008).
Individuals located at the libertarian pole are typically higher educated people working with
symbols and people. They are also often women. Individuals located at the authoritarian pole
are typically lower educated men, working with objects and documents.
In the paragraphs above I have discussed the main contributions of Kitschelt’s original two-
dimensional theoretical framework. This thesis is concerned with if and how the voting patterns
have changed in this political space. The next section will discuss the original two-dimensional
framework of Kriesi et al. (2008).
2.3.2 Integration–demarcation
Kriesi et al. (2008) base their theories on the winners and losers of globalization. The winners of
globalization are those who benefit from increased competition and should therefore support an
opening of boundaries. This is a process of international integration. The losers of globalization
are those who do not benefit from increased competition. The losers of globalization should
seek protection for themselves through supporting the closing of national borders. Kriesi et al.
(2008: 9) refer to the divide between winners and losers of globalization as a conflict between
integration and demarcation.
There is an integration-demarcation divide on both the economic and cultural dimensions.
Each dimension is structured by an open and integrationist position, and contrasted by a defensive
and protectionist one. The economic dimension is categorized by a neoliberal free trade position
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at the integration pole, and contrasted by a protectionist position with protections of the national
market as the main object at the demarcation pole. The cultural dimension is categorized by an
open universalistic, cosmopolitan position at the integration pole contrasted by a protectionist and
exclusionary position at the demarcation pole. Kriesi et al. (2008: 13) argue that the new conflict,
in the form of globalization, can be expected to reinforce the pro-state and pro-market opposition
on the economic dimension. The pro-state is in this case argued to be more protectionist. This
means that it is located at the demarcation pole. The pro-market position is in favour of national
competitiveness regarding the world markets and is therefore placed at the integration pole.
Figure 2.3 below represents the positioning of the new left parties and the populist radical
right parties, each occupying their own corner of the political space.
Figure 2.3: The positioning of parties along the integration–demarcation divide
Kriesi et al. (2008) have developed twelve issue categories representing the two political
dimensions. Each of the twelve categories represent different directions so that they can be placed
in the integration–demarcation divide. Kriesi et al. (2008) divide the issues of each category
between support versus opposition. Being supportive of an issue is placed at the integration
pole, while being against an issue is placed at the demarcation pole. The twelve categories each
represent a maximum number of issues of each category. This serves as a good overview of
central issues that could be included in operationalizing the re-theorized theoretical framework.
There are three categories on the economic dimension. These are welfare, budget and
economic liberalism. These categories refer to the traditional opposition between state and
market, left and right. The welfare category represents support versus defence for expansion of
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the welfare state, as well as support versus defence of redistributive tax reforms. The budget
category is structured by support versus defence of a rigid budgetary policy, support versus
defence for cuts in expenditures, and support versus defence of tax reductions. The last category,
the economic liberalism category, is structured by support versus defence of deregulation,
support versus opposition to market regulation, and support versus opposition to the protection
of agriculture (Dolezal 2008: 59).
There are six categories representing the cultural dimension, and an additional three categories
representing what Dolezal (2008: 59–60) refers to as a residual category. The six categories
representing the cultural dimension are cultural liberalism, Europe, culture, immigration, army
and security. The cultural liberalism category is the biggest of the six. It represents support
versus opposition of the new social movements, support versus opposition of cultural diversity
and international cooperation, support versus opposition of national sovereignty, as well as
support versus opposition of traditional values and customs. The Europe category represents one
of the new issues: support versus opposition of European integration.
The culture category represents support versus opposition towards education, culture and
scientific research, while the immigration category represents support versus opposition of a
strict immigration policy. The two last categories of the cultural dimension, army and security,
represents support versus opposition towards armed forces, defence and nuclear weapons, as
well as support versus opposition towards fighting criminality, corruption and tougher laws on
crime (Dolezal 2008: 59–60).
The last three categories are called residual categories. This is because, according to Kriesi
et al. (2008), they do not belong automatically on either the economic or cultural dimension.
The three residual categories are environment, institutional reform and infrastructure. The envi-
ronment category represents support versus opposition towards environmental protection. The
international reform category represents support versus opposition of referendums, federalism
and decentralization. At last, the infrastructure category represents support versus opposition for
improving the country’s infrastructure such as roads and public transportation (Dolezal 2008:
60).
The next section will outline the argumentation from Bornschier (2010a) and discuss his
view of the emergence of a new cleavage and the populist radical right parties.
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2.3.3 Libertarian–universalistic and traditionalist–communitarian
Bornschier (2010a) argues that the changing factors of the national and international society have
brought populist radical right parties to the political arena, struggling to preserve the old national
traditions and culture. This has, in Bornschier’s opinion, created a new cultural conflict based on
values. The new cultural conflict spans from a libertarian–universalistic pole to a traditionalist–
communitarian pole. Bornschier has named the two poles after the debate between liberals and
communitarians. The universalistic pole represents individual autonomy and community, while
the traditionalist pole represents values linked to the preservation of traditional communities,
where traditional values and customs are threatened by the multicultural society (Bornschier
2010a: 2).
Bornschier (2010a) argues that populist radical right parties consists of an ideology opposing
the development of a multicultural society placing them at the traditionalist end of the new
cultural dimension. On the other hand, the populist radical right party family constitutes a more
moderate ideology than other extreme right party groups. This is due to their belief in democracy
as well as their nativist appeal being more differentialist than exclusionist (Bornschier 2010a;
Mudde 2007: 3). Bornschier (2010b: 424) expects populist radical right parties to mobilize
voters on a communitarian and traditionalist political agenda.
When operationalizing the political dimensions, Bornschier uses the same categories as Kriesi
et al. (2008) to test his theories. He argues that the categories are for illustrative purposes only.
Bornschier’s analysis covers newspaper articles over 30 years in six West European countries.
His analysis concludes that the rise of universalistic values since the 1960s triggered a counter-
reaction, resulting in a traditionalist–communitarian issue development. Bornschier (2010a:
440) also argues that the cultural and economic dimensions stays as two separate dimension and
cannot be combined as one single political dimension as some researchers argue (van der Brug
and van Spanje 2009).
What exactly is liberalism and communitarianism from the perspective of voters attitudes?
How can they be defined, and how can they be measured or critiqued? Walzer (1990: 12)
argues that liberalism, in its simplest form, is the theoretical justification of the advancement
of knowledge, technology and development. For individuals this can be seen as the pursuit of
liberty and happiness. Communitarianism on the other hand, is the articulation of discontent
with the theoretical justification of knowledge, technology and development, and the argument
that individuality is a product of community. Walzer (1990: 11–12) argues that ever since family
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membership has decreased, loyalty towards leaders, parties and movements have also decreased.
Walzer himself states that liberals are able to stand outside all political organizations, and choose
freely amongst the parties that best serve their values and interests. They are independent voters,
choosing for themselves what party to vote for as well as choosing freshly each time (Walzer
1990: 12).
I have now discussed the dominant two-dimensional accounts by the main authors Kitschelt
(1994); Kitschelt and McGann (1995); Kriesi et al. (2008) and Bornschier (2010a). The next
section will present the background for re-theorizing the dominant two-dimensional frameworks.
2.4 Why re-theorize the structure of the political space?
Before September 11, multiculturalism was most often openly challenged by political figures
of the extreme right. Since then, issues of multiculturalism, of liberal democracy and values,
and especially of Muslims, have become part of Western European politics (Sniderman and
Hagendoorn 2007: 4). A special case in this context, is the Netherlands. Pim Fortuyn, leader of
the populist radical right party Lijst Pim Fortuyn, was a defender of liberal values and liberal
democracy. He challenged the political debate and argued that Islam was a backward religion
by its denial of equality for women and its intolerance towards homosexuality (Sniderman and
Hagendoorn 2007: 19-20). In this way, Fortuyn used his critique against immigration and Islam
as a way of promoting liberal values and to defend liberal democracy. The re-theorization of the
dominant two-dimensional framework grew out from this discussion. Fortuyn criticized Islam,
and at the same time he positioned himself as a defender of liberal values. He promoted values
of freedom, sexual equality and gender equality. In the dominant two-dimensional frameworks
the possibility of being both liberal on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension as well as being
an opponent of immigration and multiculturalism was non-existing. The electoral success of
the Lijst Pim Fortuyn gave reason to re-theorize the dominant two-dimensional theoretical
framework.
Populist radical right parties have often been labelled anti-liberal. Many populist radical
right parties in Western Europe, are though considering themselves as defenders of liberal
values (Akkerman 2005). Grouping liberal versus authoritarian values together with attitudes
towards immigration and exclusionism makes, if this is true, no sense. To allow voters and
parties to be either libertarian or authoritarian (grid), and inclusionary or exclusionary (group),
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it is necessary to separate these issues into two dimensions. Kitschelt (2012) argues that, like
Lijst Pim Fortuyn, other populist radical right parties like the Front National in France, and
Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, have tried to split these values in order to broaden the prospective
electoral coalition and to be able to include those who endorse an exclusionary position on
group, but otherwise defend a liberal position on grid (Kitschelt 2012: 246). Akkerman and
Hagelund (2007) compared the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet with the Duthch Lijst Pim Fortuyn
and discovered a broad inclusion of values constituting the grid-dimension such as family values
and gender equality.
Several articles have been written about why the Lijst Pim Fortuyn was so successful in the
national election of 2002 (Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Be´langer and Arts 2006; van Holsteyn
and Irwin 2003; Lubbers and Gu¨veli 2007; Pellikaan et al. 2007). All articles find the cultural
attitudes of voters to be of greater importance than the economic preferences. Some have a
greater focus on class-based voting (Lubbers and Gu¨veli 2007), while others focus on protest
voting (Be´langer and Arts 2006; van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003). Regardless of the original focus,
they all found different cultural values to be of importance for LPF-voting in the Netherlands.
This constitutes an important foundation for Kitschelt’s re-theorization of the political space.
The next sections will elaborate on the re-theorized three-dimensional framework as outlined
by Kitschelt (2012). Finally, some concluding remarks concerning the three dimensions will be
presented together with my hypotheses.
2.5 Grid, Group and Greed: A re-theorized theoretical frame-
work of the political space
What characteristics determine political preference formation? This is a question of endogeneity.
People may choose their political preferences due to their occupational ties, but they may also
choose their occupation because of their political preferences (Kitschelt 2012: 232).
In the sections above, various theoretical frameworks have been discussed. Ranging from
libertarian to authoritarian, from socialist to capitalist, and from libertarian–universalistic to
traditionalist–communitarian. The correction and modification of the theoretical framework
originates from the following question: are libertarians necessarily cosmopolitans, and are
authoritarians necessarily xenophobes and anti-globalists? In a recent book chapter, Kitschelt
(2012) emphasized that the political space should no longer be seen as structured along two
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political dimensions. In his perspective we ought to consider a third dimension structuring the
political space. He calls the three dimensions grid, group and greed.
The terms grid and group have existed for a long period of time under the term grid–group
cultural theory. The terms grid and group refer to two dimensions of political society. Grid–
group cultural theory is built on cultural biases. The idea is that, everything human individuals
do, their preferences and their justifications are culturally biased. This includes individuals ways
of life, political preferences, political cultures and ways of organisation (Mamadouh 1999: 396).
Cultural bias is, in the terms of grid–group cultural theory, a consistent grouping of preferences.
The group dimension questions membership and citizenship; what factors are necessary for
group membership? The group dimension is strong when individuals are member of such a
group, and it is weak when individuals do not belong to such a group. The grid dimension
constitutes certain rules, regulations and boundaries that individuals meet in their daily lives and
interaction (Douglas 1978: 7–8).
Kitschelt (2012) also introduces a third political dimension to the grid–group cultural theory.
He calls the third dimension greed. The greed dimension is the economic contribution to the
grid–group cultural theory, and is similar to Kitschelt’s definition of the socialist–capitalist
dimension (Kitschelt 1994). The greed dimension contains questions of redistribution of income
and assets where individuals can have political preferences for or against redistribution (Kitschelt
2012: 232). Being for redistribution can be seen as a way to reduce inequality, supportive of the
funding of public services, fighting for social and distributive egalitarianism, and better standards
of living. The opposition towards redistribution will be classified here as market-liberal. Market
liberal voters support open markets, privatization and deregulation.
Taken together, Grid–group cultural theory constitutes four independent cultures. These four
cultures are fatalism, individualism, hierachy and egalitarianism (Grendstad 1999). Fatalism is
constituted by high grid- and low group values. Fatalists are individuals that recognize societal
rules and constrictions, but do not belong to any group. Fatalists tend to avoid social interactions
with others. Individualism is recognized by both low grid and group values. Weak perceptions
of tolerance for societal constrictions along with weak feelings of membership. Individualists
are highly self-interested, self-fulfilling and authority-challenging individuals. Hierarchy on
the other hand is constituted by high grid and high group values. Individuals belonging to the
hierarchy-culture are categorized by strong group-membership and high respect for authorities.
Egalitarianism is recognized by low grid- and high group values. Egalitarians are ideally
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organized in small groups reaching collective decisions (Coughlin and Lockhart 1998: 36–37;
Grendstad 1999: 464–465).
Although this thesis will examine three dimensions constituted in a slightly different way
than the grid–group cultural theory, and even though there will be no thorough discussion of the
four cultures, the outline ot these four cultures are helpful in operationalizing the three political
dimensions. Kitschelt’s argument is clear. The process of preference formation needs to be
re-theorized. In the next sections I present the demand-side perspective of the three-dimensional
framework and my hypotheses.
2.5.1 The demand-side perspective
The demand-side perspective is directly related to the winning formula based on the dominant
two-dimensional account. Kitschelt (2012: 242) admits that the original winning formula is
outdated. First of all, the analysis by Kitschelt and McGann (1995) testing the winning formula
was based on 1980s data. Much have changed since then:
1. The traditional petty bourgeoisie, being a significant part of Kitschelt’s winning formula
with their market-liberal and authoritarian preferences, has shrunk significantly. This
group is therefore no longer available for the populist radical right.
2. The blue-collar working-class has declined since the 1990s. This has created a backlash
where a greater deal of the labor force are now experiencing more economic uncertainty.
In this sense there should be an increasing share of the population with more economically
redistributive (greed), more authoritarian (grid) and more exclusionist (group) positions
(Kitschelt 2012: 243). This would create a tremendous opportunity for the populist radical
right to mobilize voters.
3. The final point here is from a supply-side perspective but can be directly connected to the
demand-side as well. The events of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks in Europe where Islamic
fundamentalists challenged Western liberalism has opened new opportunities for parties
to mobilize voters on new dimensions. In this respect, populist radical right parties are
increasingly arguing that exclusionary policies are needed to prevent Islamic immigrants
and fundamentalism from undermining Western liberalism (Kitschelt 2012: 244).
The last point has made it possible for populist radical right parties to mobilize voters on
libertarian values together with exclusionary and parochial group-values. In this way, authori-
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tarian values, are no longer a necessary condition for PRR-voting. Pim Fortuyn was the first
party leader of a populist radical right party ever to test this strategy (Kitschelt 2012: 244). He
combined liberal positions of family, gender and equality with exclusionary values of nationalism
and immigration and gained broad support (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007; Pellikaan et al. 2007).
In a similar way Aarts and Thomassen (2008) show, with examples from Dutch voters, that
political conflicts are quite stable with the exception of a cultural cleavage operationalized by
integration vs. demarcation of immigration, ethnicity and European unification. Kitschelt (2012:
246) argues that populist radical right parties intensify their anti-immigrant group appeal while
they are letting go of some parts of their authoritarian grid positions, such as family roles, gender
roles, and laws and justice.
In the next, and final, section of the theory chapter I elaborate on the content of the three
dimensions and present my hypotheses.
2.6 The content of the three-dimensional political space
This section presents and discusses the political dimensions constituting grid, group and greed,
and demonstrates the different issues and categories implemented into each of the three dimen-
sions. I also present my hypotheses: one for each of the political dimensions.
In Kitschelt’s original framework, he argued that the slogan of the French revolution marked
the corner stone of the political space, constituting three ultimate values. He used the concept
of fraternity to explain the contents of the cultural libertarian–authoritarian dimension, while
he used the concepts of equality and liberty to explain the contents of the economic dimension
(Kitschelt 1994). Other researchers argue that these ultimate values are separate values that can
be used in the same framework (Sachs 2012). These ultimate values fit with the main concepts
(or ultimate values) of the three-dimensional political space.
2.6.1 Redestributive and market-liberal greed
The greed dimension represents the old economic dimension that Kitschelt (1994) named
socialist–capitalist which spans from a socialist left to a capitalist right. The economic dimension
is divided between people wanting equal economic opportunities for all with generous income
redistribution and welfare policies at the one extreme, and people wanting less redistribution,
lower taxation and free markets at the other extreme. I have chosen to name the two poles of
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the economic dimension redistribution and market-liberal. Issues typically represented by the
economic dimension are questions of deregulation, redistribution, budgetary policy (taxes) and
welfare spending. Kitschelt (1994) argues that the economic dimension in a great degree can be
centred around the conflict between private and public, and domestic and international economic
competition. Kriesi et al. (2008) categorize the economic dimension by market-liberal free trade
at the integration pole and a protectionist national position at the demarcation pole. They also,
like Kitschelt, include questions about the welfare state, distribution of assets and questions
about taxation in their operationalization of the economic dimension. In Kitschelt’s later work,
re-theorizing the political space, and introducing the economic dimension as greed, he focus
more on the economic dimension as containing questions of (re)distribution (Kitschelt 2012).
Although Kitschelt (2012) argues that money matters most, he also hypothesizes the economic
dimension to matter less for voting behaviour in countries where the mainstream parties agree on
the most important economic issues, such as redistribution and welfare spending. In these cases,
he expects the PRR-voters to be placed at the centre on the economic greed-dimension in the
three-dimensional political space. The economic dimension, and issues concerning the economy
in general, have traditionally been regarded as important for populist radical right parties and
voters (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). In Kitschelt’s re-theorization of the political
space, he expects voters of populist radical right parties to have moved either from the right pole
to the centre, or to have remained at the right side of the economic greed-dimension. Regardless
of the expected placement of voters in the political space, the economic greed-dimension is
expected to be an important factor for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting in
contemporary Western European democracies. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: The greed-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting.
2.6.2 Inclusive and exclusive group
The issues on the group-dimension have, in the previous theoretical frameworks, been included
in the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Political and social issues connected to the group-
dimension include questions of citizenship, immigration, European integration and questions of
nationalism and ethnic diversity. Important for the group dimension is the question of inclusion or
exclusion towards the different groups and issues presented here. Should immigrants be included
or excluded from citizenship rights? Should they have the right to vote? Should immigrants and
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ethnic minorities have their rights protected?
Group-issues concerning immigration and ethnic minorities have been considered the most
important issues for populist radical right parties and voters. Populist radical right parties need to
at least mobilize voters on such issues to be classified as a PRR-party (Mudde 2007). Kitschelt
(2012: 245) hypothesized that PRR-parties and voters would be placed on the exclusionary
side on the group-dimension when compared to the other mainstream parties and voters. The
substantial importance of these values have been one of the reasons for re-theorizing the political
space. Combining values of other dimensions can potentially be overshadowed by the group-
issues. In addition, as demonstrated by Pim Fortuyn, populist radical right parties and voters can
be divided on other cultural issues than those belonging to the group-dimension.
Although the issues belonging to the group-dimension are argued to be important, and
sometimes the most important, scholars strongly argue against perceiving them as single-issue
parties (Carter 2005). In the re-theorized framework constituting a three-dimensional political
space, the group-dimension is perceived as an important concept for explaining the pattern of
populist radical right voting. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: The goup-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting.
2.6.3 Libertarian and authoritarian grid
The grid-dimension is similar to the one that Kitschelt (1994) labelled libertarian–authoritarian.
Different in this framework, is the separation of group-issues as an individual and independent
dimension. The ultimate value of liberty is a good representative for the grid-dimension. The
theoretical framework of this thesis has captured the issues in the libertarian–authoritarian
dimension by contrasting libertarians versus authoritarians, or communitarians. Sachs (2012)
similarly emphasizes the ultimate value of liberty by contrasting the values of libertarians versus
communitarians. He argues that:
libertarians’ fear of developing a statist or collectivist society that suppresses choice,
decision-making, the uniqueness of individuals, and that submerges our individuality
and diversity by converting us all into mere members of groups or communities
(Sachs 2012: 370).
In this way Sachs (2012) argues that individuals and individuality are essential values in the
concept of liberty. In grid-group cultural theory, this is argued to be one of the defining features
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of the grid-dimension. The basic principles constituting the grid-dimension, is the boundary
drawing amongst individuals, constituting law and order issues, restrictions of the freedom of
each individual, e.g. religious freedom and gender equality (Lockhart 1999).
Kriesi et al. (2008) separate a cultural and an economic dimension that they argue to constitute
the political space. Dolezal (2008) presents six different categories, in addition to a residual
category, to classify the cultural dimension. Each of the six categories represents a handful of
different issues. Combining that many distinct issues and categories together to capture the
variation and structure of one political dimension can become too much. The accumulation of
issues and categories by Kriesi et al. (2008) is in itself an argument for the separation of cultural
issues into two different political dimensions; as argued by Kitschelt (2012: 245) combining
values of other dimensions can potentially be overshadowed by the group-issues. Issues that
might not have been important for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting, may
have been treated as important because of the strong effect of the group-issues.
Kitschelt (2012) emphasized that populist radical right parties and voters could be placed in
both the libertarian, centre and authoritarian poles of the grid-dimension in the three-dimensional
political space, depending on the countries examined. He argues that while PRR-parties intensify
their group-appeal they may let go of some of their authoritarian grid-positions. The positioning
of the voters on the grid-dimension may be different depending on the countries examined.
Following Kitschelt (2012) this leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: The grid-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting.
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3Data and methodology
This chapter will discuss the methods and data chosen to best answer the research question of
this thesis. The methods chosen for this thesis will be presented first followed by a discussion of
the assumptions of the methodological approach. Finally I discuss the data foundation of this
thesis.
3.1 A quantitative approach with logistic regression analysis
This thesis aims to operationalize the three-dimensional political space in Western European
democracies, and to probe the explanatory power of these dimensions for explaining the populist
radical right vote. In order to do so I have chosen to apply a quantitative approach. To be able to
generalize, a quantitative approach is necessary, as well as being able to measure effects across
a large sample of observation (George and Bennett 2004). George and Bennett (2004) argue
that a potential weakness with the quantitative approach is the relations to the objects being
researched. In quantitative methods this relation is distant, but as long as the research question
and the methodological choices are strongly embedded in the theoretical framework one ensures
good validity. An advantage with this thesis is that the variables chosen are strictly embedded in
the theories and thoroughly discussed, both theoretically and analytically. This remedies some
of the distance towards the research objects.
Due to categorized dependent variables, ordinary OLS (ordinary least squares) is not sufficient.
My dependent variable in part one of this analysis is a dichotomy of vote for a populist radical
right party. In part two it has multiple categories. The original variable asks the respondents
what party they voted for in the last national election. Respondents have been coded as 1
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if they have voted for a PRR-party and 0 if they have not. Although logistic regression is
different from ordinary regression analysis, the goal is the same, and that is to find the best
fitting and interpretable model to describe the relationship between an outcome variable and a
set of explanatory variables (Hosmer, Lameshow, and Sturdivant 2013: 1). The distinguishing
feature of a logistic regression model is that the outcome variable is binary or dichotomous.1
The general principles of logistic regression is more or less the same as for ordinary regression
models, as long as this difference is accounted for (Hosmer et al. 2013).
Figure 3.1: Illustration of linear versus non-linear relationship
Figure 3.1 compares the curvilinear relationship of the logistic regression model with the
linear relationship found in an ordinary least squares model (Menard 2002: 8). The dotted line
represents the linear model, while the S-shaped curvilinear line represents the logistic curve.
Here the values of the discrete binary dependent variable are transformed into a logistic curve
that is S-shaped. The S-shaped curve represents the probability of an event (Hair, Black, Babin,
and Anderson 2010: 338). It moves between 0 and 1, but never reaches them.
1With a dichotomous dependent variable there are two kinds of binary regression models that are mostly used for
research: logistic regression and probit regression. The two models are very similar and results are almost identical
(Skog 2004: 390). Choosing the one over the other should not have any impact on the research results.
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3.1.1 The binary model
Formally, the binary logit model can be written as2
Pr(y = 1 | x) = exp(α+βx)
1+ exp(α+βx)
The error term ε is not included in this equation because it can be calculated from y. In
this equation, ε is assumed to be logistically distributed with Var(ε) = pi2/3 which leads to the
formal binary logit model presented above. The value assumed for Var(ε) does not affect the
value of the probability. It changes the spread of the distribution but not the proportion of the
distribution above or below the threshold (0 and 1) (Long and Freese 2006: 134). The error
term in logistic regression analysis is different from ordinary linear regression analysis. It is not
normally distributed and it is not homoscedastic (Skog 2004: 360).
The results from logistic regression analysis can be estimated in two different ways: as odds
ratios or as logged odds. The odds ratios expresses the probability in terms of the odds of y = 1
(Baum 2006: 253). It describes how much more likely an outcome is to occur than for another.
If an outcome has 80 percent probability of occurring and 20 percent for not occurring then
the odds will be 0.8/0.2=4. The odds is four times larger for the outcome to occur than not to
occur (Skog 2004: 363). An advantage with estimating the results as odds is that they are easy
to interpret. However, the results presented in this thesis will not be presented as odds but as
probabilities calculated from the logged odds. The logit has no upper or lower boundary. When
the probability of an outcome to occur comes closer to 1, the logit has a positive direction. When
the probability of an outcome to occur comes closer to 0, the logit moves towards a negative
direction (Pampel 2000: 13). It is important to note that the odds, logit and probabilities are
three different ways to express exactly the same thing (Menard 2002: 13). The logit and odds
are estimated in the statistical package, while the (predicted) probabilities are being calculated
on the basis of either the odds or the logit.
3.1.2 The multinomial model
This thesis sets out to explain if and how voters can be categorized alongside a three-dimensional
political space. In order to do this it is necessary to compare the voters of the populist radical right
2All equations presented here are from Long and Freese (2006). All the equations presented in this chapter are
constructed as probability models.
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parties, not just with all other voters in a dichotomy, but with the voters of the other mainstream
parties. In this way, the voters of PRR-parties can be categorized to the left, centre or right of
the voters of the other parties on the three dimensions. In order to do this, I use the multinomial
logistic regression model, where the voters of the populist radical right parties in each country
are compared with the mainstream voters of the left and right.
An outcome is nominal when there are several unordered categories. The multinomial logit
model can be thought of as simultaneously estimating binary logits for all comparisons among
the alternatives (Long and Freese 2006: 224).
The formal statement of the multinomial logistic regression model can be written as
lnΩm|b(x) = ln
Pr(y = m | x)
Pr(y = b | x) = xβm|b for m = 1 to J
b represents the base category and is also referred to as the comparison group. For the
comparison group, the log odds of an outcome will always be 0 when it is compared to itself,
meaning that the effects of the independent variables will also be 0. This can be solved by
computing the predicted probabilities:
Pr(y = m | x) exp(xβm|1)
∑Jj=1 exp(xβ j|b)
The predicted probability is the same regardless of the base outcome b. Although the output
of the model changes with different base outcomes, the probability remains the same. The base
outcome used in this thesis is always the vote for a populist radical right party (Long and Freese
2006: 228).
3.1.3 Model estimation
Model estimation for logistic regression analysis is different than that of an ordinary regression
model. Because of the nonlinearity of the dichotomous dependent variable and the nominal
dependent variable, different estimation methods are used. Logistic regression uses maximum
likelihood to estimate the models. Maximum likelihood estimates are the values of the parameters
that have the greatest likelihood (i.e., the maximum likelihood) of generating the observed sample
of data if the assumptions of the model are true (Long and Freese 2006: 76). The likelihood
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function calculates the probability of the observed data if a given set of parameter estimates were
actually true.
The basic measure of estimating how well the maximum likelihood procedure fits the model
is by the likelihood value. In logistic regression analysis, the measuring of model estimation fit is
estimated by the value of –2 times the log of the likelihood value. This value is usually referred
to as –2LL. The minimum value of –2LL is zero and refers to a perfect model fit. Low values
therefore indicates that the model fits well, while large values indicates that the model fits poorly
(Hair et al. 2010: 419-420). The –2LL values will not be directly presented in this thesis. Instead
I present the likelihood ratio value (LR). The likelihood ratio is a test based on the likelihood
value of the model that has been estimated and a model based on H0 (Baum 2006: 256). H0
claims that the probability of Y=1 (in this case vote for a PRR-party) is the same regardless of
the values on the independent variables (X). The difference between the –2LL value of the model
based on H0 and the full model constitutes the value of likelihood ratio (Skog 2004: 375). A
significant LR test indicates that the effect of the independent variable being equivalent to zero
can be rejected (Long and Freese 2006: 144).
In addition to the likelihood ratio test, this thesis uses pseudo R2 and AIC (Akaike’s informa-
tion criterion) as additional measures of model fit. As for the LR test, pseudo R2 is also based
on the value of –2LL. The R2 value ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 where 1.0 represents a model with
perfect fit (Hair et al. 2010: 420). Pseudo R2 can be measured by different techniques. This
thesis uses the measure of McFadden’s R2. McFadden’s R2 is known as the likelihood-ratio
index and compares a model with just the intercept to a model with all the parameters (Long and
Freese 2006: 109). Regarding Akaike’s information criterion, all else being equal, the model
with the lowest AIC are considered the model with the best fit (Long and Freese 2006: 112). AIC
is calculated using the likelihood of the model and the number of parameters in the model. The
value reported by Stata is equal to the N times this value (Long and Freese 2006). Regardless of
this, the model with the highest pseudo R2 and lowest AIC, is the better-fitting model.
3.2 Assumptions of the logistic regression model
In this section I discuss the assumptions of the logistic regression models as well as the results
from the different tests. The assumptions of the logistic regression model are equivalent, but
simpler than those of an ordinary least square model. Because of the dichotomous or nominal
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dependent variable the requirements for the error term is different. The error term does not have
to be homoescedastic and it does not have to be normally distributed. There are three main
assumptions of the logistic regression model.
The first assumption regards the logistic regression curve. The curve of the logistic regression
analysis needs to be curvilinear, or S-shaped. This can be tested by performing a Hosmer-
Lemeshow test. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test measures the deviation between predicted and
observed frequents. Results from the Hosmer-Lemeshow test that are not statistically significant
(p> .05) suggest that the model cannot be rejected (Skog 2004: 381-382). If the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test is statistically significant this indicates that the model is not S-shaped. Non
S-shaped models can be remedied by including a polynomial variable or dummy variables (Skog
2004: 385). This assumption was checked for by using the Hosmer-Lemeshow test. The binary
regression models in the analysis chapter have been tested. None of them have significant results
and it is fair to say that the models fit the S-shaped curves well (Skog 2004: 383-385).
The second assumption regards the error term. The variation in the error term needs to be
independent. This assumption is always achieved with a random sample. This is the case for the
European Social Survey where the observations are independent and not influenced by each other
(Skog 2004: 380). The assumption is more vital for time series data and panel data analysis.
Because the data gathered by The European Social Survey have been selected with a random
sample the second assumption is accounted for.
The third assumption is of spuriousness. The relationship between the dependent and the
independent variables should not be caused by underlying factors that could be the cause of the
dependent variable, as well as correlated with the independent variables (Skog 2004: 380). The
most important remedy for spuriousness is a solid theoretical foundation and operationalization
of the variables included in the analysis. The theoretical foundation as well as the variable
operationalization in this thesis is solid. In addition to this, a multivariate model increases
the reliability that the results are not spurious. The binary and multinomial logistic regression
model make the assumption that the odds do not depend on other available alternatives. The
assumption is known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Long and Freese 2006:
243). To test the IIA one compare the estimated coefficients of the full model, with those of a
restricted model. This can be done by performing a Hausman–McFadden test and a Small-Hsiao
test. Both tests examine the H0 that the odds of the outcome of the full versus restricted model
are independent of other alternatives. The third assumption is the most important one as well
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as the most difficult to account for. Both the Hausman–McFadden test and the Small-Hsiao
test concludes that there are no underlying spuriousness affecting the results. The tests was
performed by estimating the full multinomial model for each country, and then estimating a
restricted model. Both tests concluded that the H0 could be supported. The odds of the outcome
of the full versus restricted model are therefore independent of other alternatives.
3.3 Data: why use surveys?
Surveys provide us with essential information regarding mass opinion on political issues (John-
ston 2008: 385). The research question of this thesis is directly connected to the attitudes of
PRR-voters. This makes survey data ideal for answering the research question.
Choosing the data to create the foundation for this thesis was a long process. Several surveys
were closely considered and evaluated. First of all I chose to use international surveys and not
national surveys. There are positive and negative sides to both. National surveys contain more
questions and more observations than international surveys, but on the other hand it creates
challenges when wanting to compare across countries because the different surveys asks different
questions to the respondents. The weaknesses of the national surveys are the strengths of
the international surveys, and vice versa. The international surveys have fewer observations
and questions, but at the same time it gives researchers the advantage of comparability across
countries. This exact advantage of comparability is the main reason that I chose to focus on the
international surveys.
The datasets considered for this thesis were the European Social Survey (ESS), the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the European Values Survey (EVS), the World Values
Survey (WVS) and Eurobaromenter. There are many reasons for choosing the European Social
Survey. It is well-documented, it is academically driven, and it has been used in many published
articles by well-known researchers. There are, nonetheless, four main reasons that determined
my choice for the European Social Survey for conducting this analysis.
1. The ESS has variables that asks the respondents what party they actually voted for in the
last national election and not what they think they would vote. Asking the respondents
what party they actually voted for is a more precise measure which I believe has more
validity.
2. The Western European countries are well represented in the ESS.
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3. The ESS contains variables representing the essence of the three dimensions. This makes
the ESS an ideal data-foundation for this thesis.
4. It is the survey that is most up to date. The interviews for the latest version of the ESS
were conducted in 2012 and makes it unique in capturing attitudes structured on three
dimensions.
An advantage with some of the other surveys, and especially the World Values Survey, is that
it provides time-series data which makes it possible to map attitudes over time. However, this is
not the goal for this analysis, but I would recommend future research to investigate this further.
For instance, the World Values Survey is carrying out a new wave from 2010–2014. This would
make excellent data for capturing attitudes over time on three dimensions.
3.3.1 The European Social Survey
The European Social Survey is a cross-national large-scale survey and is academically driven.
The ESS has been conducted every two years since its starting year in 2001. The ESS measures
patterns in attitudes, believes and behaviour of diverse populations in more than thirty countries
(ESS 2014: 5). The data gathered by the European Social Survey are selected by strict random
probability sampling, and the data gathering is conducted by face-to-face interviews (ESS 2014:
7). I use the newest version from the ESS, round 6. The 6th round contains data gathered from
24 different countries from all over Europe. The complete dataset contains 46257 respondents.
As I only include countries from Western Europe in my analysis, as well as countries with a
significant populist radical right party, I only examine seven countries in this thesis. The countries
included in this analysis are Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, Flanders and the
Netherlands.
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4Operationalizing the three-dimensional
political space
In the following subsections I will account for my operationalization of the variables representing
the three-dimensional political space included in this analysis. I will discuss them according to
the theories presented in this thesis and according to previous research. I will also account for
the validity of the different variables.
4.1 Theorizing concepts
To construct, aggregate or evaluate concepts one must first consider the theories embodied
in the concept (Goertz 2008: 103). I have already made clear that this thesis introduces two
contributions– operationalizing and testing the new theories constituting the three-dimensional
political space. The following part of this thesis constitutes the first contribution. I do this, as
Goertz (2008) suggests, by considering the theories embodied in the concept. The following
sections will assess each of the variables according to its contributions to the different dimensions
based on the theories presented in the theory chapter. Operationalizing the three-dimensional
political space based on the existing theories is essential. In addition to this I will empirically test
if the chosen issues load on the dimensions that I expect them to, by using principal components
analysis.
There are two main ways to create indices1. The first is theoretical and analytical, the
second is empirical and driven by data. This part of the analysis will employ the first approach,
1For an excellent introduction to construct scales in a similar way as I do, see Evans and Heath (1995).
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driven by theories. The advantage of using the theoretical and analytical approach, is that it
is not easily influenced by factors from the outside. I also want to create indices because the
structure of the political space is much more than just single issues. Creating indices better
represents the dimensionality that this thesis seeks to examine. The three dimensions that
have been theoretically outlined in the theory chapter, can be captured as concepts. The three
dimensions constitutes three different concepts with different content. In the sections to follow I
will emphasize the content of the variables from the European Social Survey 2012 that, based on
the theories, best classifies the concepts of the three dimensions.
In the further analysis of this thesis, I am interested in how voters of populist radical right
parties can be placed in the three-dimensional political space. All the different issues that are
presented in the operationalizing sections will therefore contain a direction, so that it is clear
exactly how the voters are expected to be situated.
4.2 The dependent variable
The dependent variable for this thesis is the respondent’s vote-choice. The following question
was asked of all respondents: What party did you vote for in the last national election of
[country]. This results in one variable per country. The different variables were then recoded into
dichotomous variables, where 1 represents vote for a populist radical right party, and 0 represents
vote for all other parties. I have created one variable which joins the different countries and one
variable for each country. This has been done so that the analysis can be run both jointly and
separately for each country.
I wanted to use a survey that asked the respondents what party they actually voted for because
this is the variable with the highest validity. A disadvantage with such a question is that voters
might not remember what party they voted for, or they do not want to answer, which eventually
results in many missing values 2.
To be able to draw conclusions based on the results it is important that enough respondents
have actually voted for the party that is being examined. I have chosen countries with a populist
radical right party that reached the overall threshold of five percent in the national election before
the 2012 collection of ESS data. This is to ensure that an adequate number of respondents have
voted for the populist radical right when conducting survey research. The descriptive statistics
2The respondents that did not remember what party they voted for, or refused to answer have been coded as
missing values and excluded from the analysis.
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from table 4.1 demonstrate the dichotomous dependent variable for each country. The columns
to the left represent the frequencies of voters who have voted for the populist radical right, and
voters who have not voted for the populist radical right. The column to the right represents the
amount of populist radical right voters in percent 3.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of vote based on the seven countries
PRR Non-PRR Min Max Percentage
PRR-voters
Dependent variable
Vote 733 7198 0 1 9.24
Norway 125 987 0 1 11.24
Denmark 105 1101 0 1 8.71
Sweden 58 1250 0 1 4.43
Finland 194 1239 0 1 13.54
Switzerland 119 560 0 1 17.53
Flanders 46 844 0 1 5.17
The Netherlands 86 1217 0 1 6.60
N=7931
The overall percentage of voters who voted for a populist radical right party based on all the
seven countries is 9.24 (733 respondents), which is an overall good representative number of
respondents that have voted for the PRR. The results from the following analysis is therefore
reliable based on the frequencies of the dependent variable. Based on the frequencies from table
4.1 there are two countries with a lower number of respondents representing the populist radical
right voters: Sweden and Flanders. The N of PRR-voters in Sweden and Flanders for the ESS
2012 is 58 and 46.
For the separate country analysis, I use both binary and multinomial logistic regression
analysis, comparing the populist radical right voters with the voters of the other mainstream
parties of the left and right. I also include those who did not vote for any party 4. When
conducting the separate country analysis, Sweden and Flanders needs to be treated with care
because of the low response rate amongst the populist radical right voters.
3The numbers in table 4.1 are based on the data set with no missing values to get the most precise results.
4Respondents who did not remember what party they voted for, or refused to answer are still excluded from the
analsysis.
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4.3 The independent variables
In the following section I will account for the operationalization of the independent variables.
The variables will be grouped and discussed in order of the three different political dimensions
outlined in the theory chapter. I will explain in detail how and why the different variables are of
importance as well as account for their validity for the research question of this thesis (Moses
and Knutsen 2007: 60; King et al. 1994: 151).
4.3.1 Operationalizing greed
This part of the analysis will concentrate around finding variables that are fitted to represent the
three-dimensional political space. To be able to answer the research question asking if such a
three-dimensional political space is needed to map populist radical right voters, I need variables
that can be grouped together representing each dimension, but that nevertheless can be compared
with the other dimensions. For conducting this analysis I will start by presenting the variables
representing the economic greed-dimension. I have chosen to build my model starting with the
economic dimension because this is the dimension that has been used to classify political parties
and voters the most. It therefore serves as a good starting point. Since the 1950s, theoretical
frameworks for understanding voting behaviour and political competition have been diverse and
separated. The theoretical frameworks developed from the economic tradition have had major
influence. A grand contributor in this respect is the work An Economic Theory of Democracy
by Downs (1957). This book inspired many scholars of political science, including Kitschelt.
An important contribution by Downs, that inspired Kitschelt’s theorization, was the economic
element, and mainly that political competition unfolds along a left—right political axis. This axis
spans from a socialist left to a market-liberal right, as already explained in the theory chapter.
The greed-dimension contains attitudes towards state ownership and economic intervention
in the economy, as well as production, industrialization, welfare spending, redistribution, and
privatization and open markets (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Harvey 2005).
Many academic researchers have argued that a market-liberal view on economics is an
important feature of PRR-parties (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Other scholars have
argued that market-liberal economics is not a defining feature and rather a secondary feature
for PRR-parties (Arzheimer 2008; Mudde 2007). Mudde (2007) argues that PRR-parties use
the economy to accentuate their nativist, authoritarian and populist appeal, but nevertheless
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argues that the economic issues are not a core feature of the PRR-parties’ political platform.
Rydgren (2004: 127) demonstrates that economic issues are of secondary importance for the
PRR-party Front National in France. Mudde may be right in that economic liberalism is a
secondary feature of PRR-parties, but if we take a look at the history of some parties, we will
find other examples. Fremskrittspartiet (then called Anders Lange’s Party) in Norway started out
as a market-liberal party introducing tax-reduction and public intervention as their main political
platform (Hagelund 2005: 149). It was not until the mid 1980’s that the immigration-issue
became important for FrP (Hagelund 2005: 150). Zaslove (2009) argues that although economic
issues no longer can be regarded as a defining core feature of PRR-parties, it is nevertheless an
important issue that needs to be taken into account in analyzing such parties.
I have chosen two variables to represent the economic greed-dimension. The first variable,
gvctzpv, asks the respondents if they believe it is important for democracy that the government
protects all citizens against poverty. The variable ranges from 0 to 10. High values indicate
that the government should not protect all citizens against poverty. I have named this variable
economic protection. This is a variable connected to the welfare state and involvement in the state
economy. According to Kitschelt’s theories, populist radical right voters should be opponents of
a welfare system that protects citizens. The left pole of this variable signifies attitudes supportive
of the welfare state in protecting citizens against poverty, while the right pole of this variable
signifies opposition of the welfare state in protecting citizens against poverty. The validity of
this variable is good for two main reasons. The first is that it represents an essential issue in the
economic greed-dimension by focusing on the protection of citizens against poverty which is
directly connected to the welfare state. The second is the use of the word citizens. A reason for
populist radical right voters being sceptical towards universal welfare policies is the universal
terminology. Including the word citizens in the variable-question excludes the group-element
from this variable, increasing its validity. Voters with rightist attitudes on this variable should be
motivated by the economic greed-dimension alone, and not influenced by the other dimensions.
The second variable grdfinc, asks the respondents if they believe it is important for democracy
in general that the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels. The
variable ranging from 0 to 10 and is coded so that high values indicate that it is not important for
democracy that the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels. I have
named this variable income redistribution. This variable represents the redistribution-issue of the
economic greed-dimension. The equality-term is very central for this variable. Should people be
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equal in the means of income, or should they not? As for the economic protection-variable, the
rightist pole signifies a minimum level of government intervention in the economy, but in this
case, by not reducing the differences in income levels.
The economic issues in the European Social Survey 2012 are not as well represented in
surveys as cultural issues. This is a common issue with most surveys where attitudes towards
economic issues are not as commonly represented as attitudes towards political and cultural issues
(Dolezal 2008: 61). Using a certain data material sets some boundaries of what issue-categories
are represented. The most important issue categories for the economic greed-dimension are
covered by the ESS 2012. Ideally I would have chosen more than two variables to represent the
different aspects of the economic dimension including taxes, privatization, the welfare state as
well as the two issues already included. Unfortunately, the two variables are the only variables
including an economic issue present in the ESS (2012). Another reason is that Kitschelt (2012)
could be right in expecting economic issues of being of second importance, or perhaps not
important for PRR-voting at all.
Both of the variables chosen to represent this political dimension are coded so that they
measure rightist market-liberal economic preferences from the respondents. Positive coefficients
in the further analysis indicate more market-liberal attitudes for the populist radical right voters.
Table 4.2 below represents descriptive statistics of the two variables based on the seven countries.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for greed based on the seven countries
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Greed
Income redistribution 2.39 2.21 0 10
Economic protection 1.57 1.75 0 10
N=7931
It is clear from table 4.2 that the mean distribution of the two economic variables are quite
low, with a mean of 2.39 for the income redistribution-variable and 1.57 for the economic
protection-variable. This indicates that the voters examined in this thesis, are generally to the
left on the economic axis. The descriptive statistics in the table above is based on all the voters
from all seven countries with listwise delition of missing values (Allison 2001). Although the
descriptive statistics does not show the distribution of means for the different countries, it can
be expected that the Nordic countries are more supportive towards state intervention in the
economy than the other countries in this analysis. This is because the Nordic countries has a
strong tradition for a strong and well-functioning welfare state ensured by large state intervention
(Kleinman 2002).
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4.3.2 Operationalizing group
In grid-group cultural theory, politics is, in the first place, about drawing boundaries. The
boundaries that are drawn constitutes the group-dimension where the line is drawn between
friends and foes. For populist radical right parties, this is done by categorizing the in-group and
the out-group. Who belongs to the in-group and who belongs to the out-group? Who are the
others? The group-dimension represents the nativist appeal of populist radical right parties and
their voters.
Countless research have found issues of immigration and ethnicity important for PRR-voting
in Western European democracies. It can therefore be argued that attitudes representing the
greed-dimension and the group-dimension have been the dominant issues that should be stable
across countries. The group-dimension outlined in this thesis represents the group-issue. I have
carefully selected four different variables to represent the group-dimension based on the theories.
In this section I will outline the issues from the European Social Survey that best describe the
group-appeal of the group-dimension. What is interesting about the group-dimension is that
all issues containing an us and them classification can theoretically be categorized as an issue
belonging to the group-concept. Following Goertz (2006: 27), concepts are about ontology and
deciding what is important about an entity. For the group-dimension the important characteristics
are the separation of an in-group and an out-group. The issues that will be discussed here, all
represent a group-appeal referring to an in-group and an out-group.
The variable euftf represents the EU-issue. Respondents were asked if they believe that
European unification should go further or if it has already gone too far. The variable ranges from
0 to 10 where high values indicate that European unification has already gone too far. Populist
radical right parties are not in favour of the European Union5. Dansk Folkeparti (DF) have stated
that they want to leave the EU and that they oppose it (Mudde 2007: 163). Buch and Hansen
(2002) have demonstrated that the Danish people have a very low level of identification towards
Europe, and that they are more attached to the nation itself. European governments are restricted
in their policies by the European Union due to European integration (Fennema 2005). Thus
PRR-parties regard the EU as an outside threat, making decisions on behalf of others, weakening
national borders and threatening nationality (Mudde 2007; Eatwell 2005; Kriesi and Frey 2008;
Almeida 2010). I have named this variable European Union. The European Union-variable can
be regarded as a controversial issue. This is because it can contain more attitudes than just the one
5FrP is an exception.
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representing this dimension. Both economic issues and exclusive attitudes towards immigration
can be captured by this variable, as well as believing in a strong state. The EU has become part
of a shared authoritative power with national and subnational governments. European integration
has involved deepening and broadening of authoritative decision-making (Marks and Wilson
2000: 436). Nevertheless, Kriesi et al. (2008) emphasize European integration as one of the
defining features of populist radical right parties brought about by globalization and immigration.
According to the theories, the EU-issue is to consider as a central issue for populist radical right
parties. Theoretically, this should also be an issue that mobilizes the voters of populist radical
right parties. For the European Union-variable the European unification refers to the out-group,
while the in-group is the nation either wanting to expand European unification, or believing that
it has gone too far.
Populist radical right parties are very sceptical towards ethnic minorities. They find it
intolerable that ethnic minorities and their rights are protected, and especially within the borders
of their state (Mudde 2007: 149). In the ESS 2012, the variable imsfetn, asks the respondents
if they believe that their country should allow people of a different race or ethnic group as the
country’s majority to come and live there. The variable ranges from 0 to 3 where high values
indicate that the country should not allow people of a different race or ethnic group as country’s
majority to come and live here. I have named this variable multiculturalism. The defence of
national identity against all threats, both outside and inside the state, is a core element of the
populist radical right party family (Betz 2005: 34). The term ethnic minorities are connected to
all groups that is not the majority of a country, being Samis in Norway, Muslims in Denmark
or Indonesians in the Netherlands. Pim Fortuyn stated that Democracy with its free expression,
its separation of church and state and equality between men and women, in short our way of
life, is too precious to let them be traded in for the green totalitarianism of Islam (Betz 2005:
35). He regarded Islam as a great threat to liberal democracy and wanted to get rid of it with all
means possible. The multiculturalism-variable refers to ethnic minorities/groups and people of a
different race as the out-group. In this case, the in-group is the country’s majority, or the nation.
The variable asks a clear question that does not involve any noise in involving other dimensions,
and most importantly it represent both immigration and ethnic minorities which are essential
issue-categories for the group-dimension.
The goal of this section has been to choose variables based on theoretical evidence, by
discussing the content of the variables and how they can contribute best in representing the
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group-dimension in the further analysis. The next variable represents the group-issue excellently.
The variable imueclt from the ESS 2012, asks the respondents if they would say that their
country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants. It ranges from 0 to 10, and high
values indicate that the country’s cultural life is undermined by immigrants. I have named this
variable cultural threat. The variable represents an important feature of populist radical right
parties. They believe that some groups of ethnic origin or cultural background do not belong in
their ethnocratic concept of society. In their opinion, immigration, the concepts of citizenship,
and multiculturalism represents a fundamental threat to liberal democracy (Betz 2005: 36).
Immigrants and ethnic minorities are regarded as the out-group and therefore understood as
a threat to the superior in-group which represents the nation. The essence of the group-issue
is captured excellently by the cultural threat-variable. The cultural threat-variable represents
the external threat of immigration from outside which may cause changes to the country and is
expected to be perceived as dangerous and threatening by PRR-voters. It captures the nationalistic
element from the group-dimension excellently, that immigration is regarded as an outside threat
towards the pure in-group (Mudde 2007).
As already made clear, the essence of the group-dimension is the group-element. What
should be done with immigrant- and ethnic minority groups? How do these groups affect the
country? What rights should they have? The variable imwbcnt asks the respondents if they
would say that their country is made a worse or better place to live because of immigration. The
variable ranges from 0 to 10. High values indicate that immigrants make the country a worse
place to live. I have named this variable quality of life. Populist radical right parties have, by
many scholars, been categorized as single-issue parties. Mudde (2007), though not considering
the populist radical right parties as single-issue parties, argues that the minimalist definition of
PRR-parties must contain the nativist appeal. To be classified as a populist radical right party,
the parties must at least mobilize voters over the immigration-issue. The quality of life-variable
is a good measure of this nativist appeal. It captures the attitudes of voters who believe that the
country is made a worse place to live because of immigrants, and clearly separates the in-group
from the out-group.
Table 4.3 represents the descriptive statistics of the four variables chosen to represent the
group-dimension of this thesis.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for group based on the seven countries
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Group
European Union 5.07 2.38 0 10
Quality of life 4.27 2.05 0 10
Cultural threat 3.49 2.19 0 10
Multiculturalism 1.24 .783 0 3
N=7931
The European Union-variable has, in the entire sample, a mean placed at the centre. The
quality of life-variable and the cultural threat-variable have slightly lower means than the
European Union-variable. This indicates that, based on the entire sample, voters are overall quite
inclusive towards immigrants, with more centrist attitudes towards the EU.
4.3.3 Operationalizing grid
In the paragraphs ahead, I will present and discuss the selection of variables representing the grid-
dimension. This will be done in the same way as above, by focusing on the theoretical consistency
of the variables. I have started by going back to older work such as Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik,
Levinson, and Sanford (1950), and worked my way up to the most resent theories by Kitschelt
(2012). Adorno et al. (1950) classified the authoritarian personality using Freudian techniques.
The concept of authoritarianism was classified as predispositions to intolerance. However, the
seminal study of Adorno et al. (1950) have received both theoretical and methodological critique,
especially for their Freudian perspective on the childhood origins of authoritarianism (Altemeyer
1981; Stenner 2005). Going back to grid–group cultural theory, I have already emphasized that
politics in the first place is about boundary drawing. Secondly, politics is about the importance of
following a certain amount of rules. This constitutes the grid-dimension, i.e. sharing obligatory
rules, as well as the members of the society’s rights. These rights are, e.g. to express their
preferences, choosing their own life style, and following traditions and customs (Kitschelt 2007:
1179). While the group-dimension is about group-membership, the grid-dimension is about
restrictions on individual behaviour (Grendstad 2003: 2). Following Goertz (2006), the important
characteristics of the grid-concept is the drawing of boundaries through rights and restrictions,
making issues of law and order and choosing life style essential for capturing the essence of the
grid-dimension. Based on this, and the theories laid out in the theory chapter, I have chosen five
issues from the European Social Survey 2012 that best represents the grid-dimension.
An important contribution to the grid-dimension is the traditional element. The traditional
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element includes gender issues, gay rights, family issues and religious issues. The European
Social Survey 2012 has two questions concerning such traditional issues. I have chosen two
different variables to represent the traditional element of the grid-dimension. The first variable,
freehms, asks the respondents if gay men and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish.
The variable ranges from 0 to 4 where high values indicate that gay men and lesbians should not
be free to live life as they wish. I have named this variable gay rights. It is important to note that,
depending on how you define it, the gay rights-variable can be linked to the group-dimension.
This is because it contains an element of an in-group and an out-group, the out-group being gays
and lesbians. If one follows the theories by Kitschelt (2012) it is important not to categorize
sexual minorities in the same way as ethnic minorities and immigrants. These theories, inspired
by the openly homosexual Pim Fortuyn, depend on liberal comprehensions of sexual minorities
and gender roles to be correctly defined. It is therefore more accurate to categorize the variable
concerning sexual minorities at the grid-dimension rather than at the inclusive–exclusive group-
dimension. The gay rights-issue is one of the basic elements representing the grid-dimension. It
represents a classical hierarchic element by asking what should be allowed and what should not.
In this particular case the variable represents the rights of sexual minorities and if they should be
free to live their lives as they wish. This variable has an obvious authoritarian element. Thinking
back to the three ultimate values of the French revolution (equality, liberty and fraternity), this
variable represents the value of liberty. It involves questions of freedom and the treatment of
those committed to a certain lifestyle. The gay rights-variable is one of the variables that most
clearly cannot be connected to immigration in one way or another. Although it contains a group-
element it is fair to say that authoritarian versus libertarian values on the gay rights-issue cannot
be explained by exclusionist values towards immigration, as for example negative views on the
universal welfare state. The gay rights-issue is, in this way, a great indicator for representing the
grid-dimension without correlating with the issues representing the group-dimension.
The second variable representing the traditional element is imptrad. The variable asks the
respondents if it is important to follow traditions and customs handed down by religion and family.
The variable ranges from 0 to 5 where high values indicate that it is important to follow traditions
and customs. I have named this variable tradition. Pim Fortuyn promoted anti-immigrant
values along with liberal socio-cultural values regarding religion, gay marriage, euthanasia and
gender values. Bornschier (2010a) argues that traditional values and the protection of these
values are important for the populist radical right and their electorate. Walzer (1990) argues
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that traditionalist values are important for communitarianism. Universalistic principles may
lead to violations of traditions within established communities. In this way, communuitarianism
argues that identities are grounded in our cultural tradition (Bornschier 2010a). The protection
of traditional values have been used to explain the influence of populist radical right parties
(Minkenberg 2000). It stands as a contrast to multiculturalism rejecting different religions and
customs. Following this train of thought, the tradition-variable can also be linked to immigration
and the group-dimension, by wanting to protect tradition by rejecting the culture of immigrants.
The variable, as it is, does not ask questions about immigration, but of following traditions
and customs. As already argued, the essence of the grid-dimension is of boundary drawing
and rights and restrictions. The boundary drawing for the tradition-variable is not a direct law
and order-issue, but an expectation of individuals (of the in-group) to respect and honour their
traditions and customs.
Another section included in the grid-dimension is one that often has been classified as a
classic populist radical right feature, namely the authoritarian appeal. I use Mudde (2007; 2012)
as the defining feature for classifying populist radical right parties. Mudde’s maximum definition
claims that populist radical right parties have a significant authoritarian appeal on politics.
Altemeyer (1981) classified right-wing authoritarianism as the covariation of authoritarian
regression, submission and conventionalism. Typical authoritarian issues are believing in a
strong state, believing in the importance of following rules, and believing in the importance of a
safe and secure society where criminal actions are punished severely (Mudde 2007: 145). These
are classical issues concerning libertarian versus authoritarian values and should be included
in the analysis. I have chosen three variables to represent the libertarian versus authoritarian
element of the grid-dimension.
The first variable, impsafe, asks the respondents if they believe it is important to live in safe
and secure surroundings and to avoid anything that might endanger safety. The variable ranges
from 0 to 5. I have coded the variable so that high values indicate that it is important to live in
secure surroundings and to avoid anything that might endanger safety. Respondents with high
values for this variable are typically individuals with zero-tolerance for criminal actions. I have
named this variable security. Security is an important part of the authoritarian appeal of populist
radical right parties. Most parties call for the building of more prisons to be able to hold a secure
and safe society. Most parties also argue that the current legal system is too soft and focused on
rehabilitation rather than to protect citizens from the criminals (Mudde 2007: 146–147).
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The second variable, imprule, asking the respondents if they believe it is important that people
follow rules and do what they’re told, ranges from 0 to 5. High values indicate that it is important
that people do what they’re told and follow rules, even when no-one is watching. This is a
classic measure of authoritarianism where following rules and maintaining order is understood
as the right thing to do. I have named this variable follow rules. The follow rules-variable
is a good representative for Mudde’s definition of authoritarianism. He argues that following
rules and obeying authorities is a defining feature of the authoritarian element. In addition, the
insubordination of the rules set by the authorities should be punished, sometimes severely. This
variable captures the very essence of authoritarianism. Going back to the older and original texts
of authoritarianism, Adorno et al. (1950) characterized an authoritarian person as being raised by
strict rules and seeking the same pattern when becoming adults. The variable also corresponds
with more updated definitions of authoritarianism by Stenner (2005). The boundary drawing that
captures authoritarianism for this variable is the very core of this element, namely the importance
of following rules at all times, even when no one is watching.
The third variable representing the authoritarian appeal, is ipstrgv. The variable asks the
respondents if they believe it is important that the government ensures safety against threats and
to live in a strong state that defends its citizens. The variable ranges from 0 to 5. High values
indicate that it is important that the government ensures safety against all threats and that the
state is strong so it can defend its citizens. I have named this variable strong state. A common
feature amongst populist radical right parties is the view of contemporary democracies as too
weak and incapable of defending themselves against both outside and inside threats (Mudde 2007:
146). Populist radical right parties want to strengthen the independence of the police force as
well as build more prisons and increase the maximum penalty. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992)
argue that authoritarians favour longer punishments for criminal actions than non-authoritarians.
They also argue that religious and traditionalist people are more authoritarian in their way of
thinking. We can therefore expect a correlation between the variable imptrad representing the
traditional element with these three variables representing authoritarian values. The strong
state-variable is concerned with safety and security, but the issue is directed towards outside
instead of inside threats. The variable also asks if the state should be strong to defend its citizens.
The defence of outside threats could trigger many thoughts for voters. For instance, voters with
exclusive attitudes for the European Union-variable should also have authoritarian attitudes on
the strong state-variable. However, these two variables do not correlate. The boundary drawing
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that is central for this variable is the insurance of safety against threats. This implies, as for the
previous variables, a certain amount of ground rules that must be followed.
The five variables chosen to represent the grid-dimension have very clear contents not
referring to other issues captured by other dimensions. The descriptive statistics of the five
variables is presented in table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for grid based on the seven countries
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Grid
Gay rights .705 .888 0 4
Tradition 3.15 1.33 0 5
Security 3.28 1.27 0 5
Strong state 3.35 1.19 0 5
Follow rules 2.97 1.35 0 5
N=7931
The descriptive statistics presented in the table above indicate that the voters in Western Eu-
rope are overall very liberal towards gay rights-issues. The descriptive statistics also demonstrate
that the voters are overall placed at the centre on the other four issues.
4.3.4 Excluded issues
This thesis sets out to examine the three-dimensional political space in relations to populist
radical right voters in Western European democracies. Because of the exclusive focus on the
three dimensions I have excluded some issues that have often been connected to populist radical
right parties. I will briefly explain why these issues have been excluded.
Populism
Research have demonstrated that populist radical right parties use a populist rhetoric. They
present themselves as working for the people and with the people (Golder 2003; Mudde 2007).
Populist radical right parties wish to solve the problems that they see as introduced by the state
by letting the people decide. They argue that political parties and politicians should listen to the
vox populi, the voice of the people, and not the experts and judges (Fennema 2005: 10-11). The
concept of populism when connected to the voters, are usually seen as a way to protest against
the government. In this thesis, I am concerned with the issues belonging to the three dimensions,
and to examine if the issues constituting the three dimensions are able to distinguish the populist
radical right voters from the voters of other mainstream parties. The protest element does not
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belong in such a framework.
Environmental issues
Environmental issues have been linked to immigration issues. The populist radical right party,
Nationale Aktion of Switzerland, was the first party to incorporate environmental issues in their
political programme stating that Switzerland being a small country was overpopulated and it’s
land spoiled due to an overflow of immigrants6 (Skenderovic 2007: 169). It is possible to argue
that environmental issues fit the grid-dimensions because of the restrictions caring about the
environment might trigger. Protection of the environment and similar issues require changes of
lifestyle as well as keeping an open mind towards such challenges. It is therefore arguable that
voters can be both libertarian and authoritarian on such issues. Nevertheless, the environmental
issues do not fit the three-dimensional framework as it is. Future research might include such
issues as a residual category.
Control variables
This thesis does not contain control variables. There are many reasons for this decision. First
of all the goal of this thesis is to operationalize and empirically test Kitschelt’s re-theorized
three-dimensional framework, and not to explain voting in the best possible way. The most
common control variables used when doing research on populist radical right voters are gender,
age, education, unemployment and occupation. Although there are no control variables presented
in the analysis of this thesis, I have run all the models with control variables just to examine
if controlling for certain demographic variables affect the results. All the models that will be
presented in the further analysis have been run with the variables gender, age, unemployed
and education. The results that will be presented in the further analysis did not change when
controlled for the most common socio-demographic factors.
4.4 Principal components analysis
To test if the variables that I have chosen load on the dimensions that I have outlined them to
do, I use principal components analysis (PCA). PCA allows a large number of independent
variables to be systematically reduced into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables, called principal
6The Nationale Aktion lost almost all its significance in the late 1990’s due to the popularity of the SVP.
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components (Dunteman 1989: 5). These components make it easier to interpret what variables
that belong together, for example, on a political dimension. The goal of principal components
analysis is to reduce the dimensionality of the data (Dunteman 1989: 7). In this way it works
as a tool for developing further analysis and indices (Wold, Esbensen, and Geladi 1987). PCA
searches for linear combinations of the original variables that are uncorrelated, in order to capture
most of the variation. The first principal component detected is the linear composite closest to
the fit to the n observarions to the p dimensional space (Dunteman 1989: 10). The goal of PCA
is to extract the most important information from the data, compress the size of the data, and
thus simplify it (Abdi and Williams 2010: 434).
Kitschelt and McGann (1995) used questions from the World Values Survey, and in the same
way as I do, tested the loadings of the questions they had chosen with principal components
analysis. The goal of PCA is not to empirically test if the politics in the seven Western European
democracies takes place along three dimensions, but rather to test if the questions that I have
chosen from the European Social Survey 2012 belong to the three separate dimensions outlined
from the theories.
In the sections above, I operationalized the questions that I chose to represent the three
dimensions outlined by Kitschelt (2012). Although I based my decisions on the existing theories,
the variables I ended up with are based on my judgement of what questions from the European
Social Survey 2012 that best fit the three different dimensions of grid, group and greed. The
principal components analysis is a good reliability check to test if the variables that I have
chosen really load on the dimensions that I have outlined them to. The results from principal
components analysis, presented in table 4.5 show that the questions are grouped along three
different dimensions in the way that I had thought, with the exception of the gay rights-issue.
The results from the principal components analysis presented in table 4.5 suggests that it is
unproblematic to find components on the three dimensions. The results are more deviant than
first expected. PCA finds that the components load on three dimensions, but a central theoretical
item does not empirically load as expected. The gay rights-issue somewhat surprisingly does not
load on factor 2 together with the other grid-issues.
The principal components analysis in table 4.5 are adjusted with varimax rotation. The
components with eigenvalues greater than .5 are in bold for easier interpretation of the results.
All variables are also coded so that the components should have the same sign.
It is clear from the results that the questions chosen from the European Social Survey 2012
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Table 4.5: Issue loadings using principal components analysis
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Group
European Union 0.5717 -0.1361 -0.1985
Quality of life 0.8349 0.0574 0.0749
Cultural threat 0.8013 0.0868 0.1059
Multiculturalism 0.7354 0.1486 0.0617
Grid
Gay rights 0.3305 0.2711 0.0448
Tradition 0.0841 0.6442 -0.0086
Security 0.1302 0.6516 -0.1294
Strong state 0.0828 0.6250 -0.2958
Follow rules 0.0468 0.6853 0.0675
Greed
Income redistribution 0.0523 -0.0567 0.8479
Economic protection 0.0831 -0.0525 0.8385
Eigenvalues 2.358 1.831 1.593
Principal components analysis with varimax rotation
Values greater than .5 are in bold
load on three dimensions, as expected. As already noted, it is surprising that the gay rights-
variable does not load on the grid-dimension as I expected it to. The gay rights-issue is one
of the most central issues for re-theorizing the political space inspired by Pim Fortuyn. As is
made clear from table 4.5, the gay rights-variable cannot be included in the index to represent
the grid-dimension in the further analysis. However, I choose to incorporate it in the further
analysis as a secondary issue. Based on the results from PCA it is not possible to incorporate
the gay rights-issue into the grid-dimension, but it can nevertheless be included in the further
analysis as a separate issue. The literature on gay rights-issues in respect to political institutions,
parties and voters, are almost non-existing (Bob 2012). It is interesting that this appears to be a
different issue than the ones representing the three dimensions.
The remaining variables load on the expected components. Principal components analysis
is often used to create indices where values greater than .5 loading on the same factor can be
combined in an index. I construct indices using the variables carefully chosen to represent each
dimension. I construct indices by multiplying the variables representing each dimension together.
I thereafter standardize them by dividing the computed index by its number of values. This
results in an index ranging from 0 to 1. To be able to compare the results from each dimension,
as well as the gay rights-issue, with each other it is important that the indices are standardized7.
The greed-dimension was constructed by multiplying the economic protection-variable with
the income redistribution-variable. This resulted in an index ranging from 0 (0+0=0) to 20
7More information about alpha values for each index, as well as correlation tables can be found in the appendix.
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(10+10=20), that was again divided on 20, resulting in an index ranging from 0 to 1. In addition,
I tested the reliability of the index using Chronbach’s alpha (α) (Peterson 1994). The reliability
score of the index representing the economic dimension was .66. It is therefore recommended to
treat the two variable as issues representing the same dimension. I have named this index greed.
The group-dimension was constructed in the same way as above, by multiplying the variables
chosen to represent the dimension from the European Social Survey. I multiplied the variables
European Union, quality of life, cultural threat and multiculturalism. In the same way as for
the greed-index, I standardized the variable so that it ranges from 0 to 1. The index has a
reliability score for α of .67, the same as for the greed-index. This indicates that the index can
be constructed based on results from both principal components analysis and Chronbach’s alpha.
I have named this index group.
The grid-dimension was constructed, also by multiplying the variables chosen to represent
the grid-dimension and then standardizing it so that it ranges from 0 to 1. For this dimension,
one item was excluded from the index as it did not load on the same dimension. The index
was created by multiplying the variables tradition, security, strong state and follow rules. The
reliability score of α for this index is .60. Both Chronbach’s alpha and the results from principal
components analysis approves of creating an index of the four variables chosen to represent the
grid-dimension. I have named this index grid.
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5Analyses
I start this analysis chapter by testing the indices constructed to represent the three-dimensional
political space. This is done by testing one index at a time in a bivariate model before including
them all together in a multivariate logistic regression model. Thereafter I present the results from
the cross-country analysis, by introducing and discussing the results for one country at a time.
5.1 Testing the indices representing the three-dimensional po-
litical space
In this section I will test if the three dimensions greed, group, and grid, together with the gay
rights-issue, are important explaining the populist radical right voting pattern in contemporary
democracies in Western Europe. The results are presented in Model 1 through 5, where Model 1
through 4 tests one dimension and issue at a time, while Model 5 combines them all into one
analysis. I use binary logistic regression analysis where the dependent variable is a dichotomous
0-1, where 1 represents a vote for the populist radical right. I use clustered standard errors which
specifies that the observations are independent across the seven countries, but not necessarily
independent within the countries (Long and Freese 2006: 86). I will comment the results for each
model before having a further discussion of the final model. When commenting the final model I
will also demonstrate the predicted probabilities of the three dimensions and gay rights-issue
graphically.
In Model 1, results for the greed-index alone is presented. In the theory chapter I discussed
that scholars disagree if socio-economic values are important for populist radical right voting,
and to what extent. The results from table 5.1 indicate that the economic dimension alone does
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Table 5.1: Indices representing the three-dimensional political space
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Greed .217 -.280
(.354) (.402)
Group 6.09*** 5.97***
(.584) (.599)
Grid 1.32** -.030
(.534) (.513)
Gay rights 1.43*** .524**
(.215) (.211)
Constant -2.32*** -5.30*** -3.14*** -2.58*** -5.27***
(.229) (.436) (.403) (.181) (.590)
N=7931
LR Chi2 0.38 108.92*** 6.09** 44.34*** 174.15***
Pseudo R2 0.0002 0.1451 0.0068 0.0174 0.1475
AIC 4890.23 4181.93 4857.77 4806 4176.54
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
not have any significant effect (p=0.631) on the probability of voting for the populist radical
right, rather than for the other parties in contemporary democracies in Western Europe.
The group-index presented in Model 2 has, as expected, a positive coefficient and is sta-
tistically significant at the .001 level. Looking at the strong coefficient, the group-dimension
is clearly substantially important in mobilizing voters for the populist radical right in Western
Europe. The model fit has also improved significantly compared to Model 1. Pseudo R2 is now
14.5 and AIC has decreased from 4890.23 to 4181.93.
The grid-index in Model 3 has a positive coefficient in a binary logistic regression model and
is statistically significant at the .01 level. The result from Model 3 alone indicate that PRR-voters
can be placed to the right of the other voters when they are compared to all other voters for
all seven countries in a bivariate model. When comparing Model 2 and 3, AIC and pseudo R2
indicate that Model 3 fits worse than Model 2.
The gay rights-variable in Model 4, also has a positive coefficient. The result from Model 4
is statistically significant at the .001 level. The coefficient is, similar to the grid-index, not as
strong as group in Model 2. AIC and pseudo R2 indicate that Model 4 has a better fit than Model
1 and 3, but it still fits worse than Model 2.
In Model 5 all variables are included simultaneously. This is to test all the variables in a
multivariate model to control for spurious effects. Only two of the variables remain significant
at the .05 level. Group remains the strongest coefficient and significant at the .001 level. The
gay rights-variable also remains statistically significant at the .01 level, but the coefficient of gay
rights is not as strong as group. These results support Kitschelt’s re-theorization of the political
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space. The results demonstrate that it is meaningful to distinguish group from grid. The results
from Model 5 indicate that the effect of libertarian versus authoritarian values are not necessary
to distinguish populist radical right voters in a binary model. Combining such issues together
with group might camouflage insignificant results from grid as significant because the effect of
group is so strong. The second interesting result from Model 5 is that separating gay rights from
grid, as suggested by the principal components analysis, gets empirical support.
The results presented in Model 5 are different from the bivariate models. The statistically
significant result for the grid-dimension is now insignificant (p=0.953). The greed-index remains
insignificant (p=0.486), while group remains the strongest coefficient significant at the .001
level. In addition, the gay rights-issue is also statistically significant at the .01 level. The same
analysis as presented in table 5.1 has been run for each country individually. The results were
almost identical and I will therefore not present the full results in the text 1. I will now present
the predicted probabilities for each dimension as well as the gay rights-issue from Model 5
graphically, and discuss the results for each of the graphs. I will also discuss the results for each
country according to the graphical presentations.
The predicted probabilities presented in figure 5.1, demonstrate the distribution for the
greed-dimension, all the countries compared.
Figure 5.1: Predicted probabilities for greed with 95% Cls
The predicted probabilities are overall around 8 percentage points regardless of the different
values of the greed-index. This result does not explain the pattern of populist radical right voting.
1I have included the binary models for each country in the appendix.
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When computing the analysis by country the results remain the same. None of the countries have
a statistically significant result for the greed-index when conducting a binary logistic regression
analysis. The results indicate that the greed-dimension is not necessary for explaining the pattern
of populist radical right voting when compared to all the other voters. However, if the PRR-voters
are placed to the left of the mainstream conservative parties in the respective countries, as well
as to the right of the mainstream parties of the left, this would fail to be demonstrated by the
analysis above, because all these parties are grouped together in the dichotomous dependent
variables (Kitschelt 2007: 1183). It is therefore necessary to conduct further analysis where the
mainstream parties of the left, centre and the right are being compared to the populist radical
right in each country.
Figure 5.2: Predicted probabilities for group with 95% Cls
Figure 5.2 demonstrates the distribution of the predicted probabilities ranging from the lowest
(0) to the highest (1) values of the group-index. When conducting the analysis by country, the
results remained almost identical to those from Model 5. The group-dimension remained the
strongest coefficient for each case and was also statistically significant at the .001 level in each
case. Based on the binary results it is clear that the group-dimension is the most important in
explaining voting patterns for the populist radical right. It is also clear that when voter’s attitudes
are at the exclusionary side of the group-dimension they are significantly and substantially more
likely to vote for the populist radical right in any of the seven countries represented in this
analysis. Grouping all the countries together, the predicted probability of voting for the populist
radical right ranges from 0.5 to 67 percent. The graphic curve presented in figure 5.2 is also
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quite steep when ranging from the more centrist values to the more exclusionary values.
Figure 5.3: Predicted probabilities for grid with 95% Cls
The graphical presentation of the predicted probabilities in figure 5.3 says it all. When
comparing all the countries into one analysis, the likelihood of voting for the populist radical
right is equal for all the values of the grid-index. This indicates that populist radical right voters
are widely scattered across the entire grid-dimension. The predicted probability of voting for the
populist radical right based on the grid-dimension, is just below 10 percentage points regardless
of the values of grid. When compared to all other voters, PRR-voters cannot be distinguished
from the voters of the other parties when all countries are combined together. The one exception
is the Swiss case where the grid-index has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant
at the .001 level. Voters of the SVP can therefore be placed to the right of the other voters in
Switzerland on the grid-dimension. A similar result is also found in Finland where the grid-index
has a positive coefficient and just fails to be statistically significant at the .05 level (p=0.060).
Although the result is not statistically significant, it can be expected to find interesting results for
the grid-dimension in the Finnish case when the PS-voters are being compared to the voters of
the other mainstream parties.
Figure 5.4 is the final graph to be presented. The figure presents the predicted probabilities of
the gay rights-issue graphically. In contrast to the grid- and greed-dimensions there is a clearer
pattern for the gay rights-issue. As the attitudes of the voters move towards more authoritarian
values on the gay rights-variable the probability of voting for the populist radical right increases.
When compared to all other voters the PRR-voters can be placed to the right on the gay rights-
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Figure 5.4: Predicted probabilities for gay rights with 95% Cls
issue. When conducting the same analysis by country, the results for the gay rights-issue was
significant only in one case: the Swedish. As in Model 5, the coefficient in the Swedish case was
positive and statistically significant at the .05 level.
There has been little research on the topic of gay rights and sexual freedom in relations to
populist radical right parties and voters (Bob 2012). This is interesting because some parties,
like the Austrian FPO¨, have this included in their party programme (FPO¨ 2011). The Austrian
FPO¨, unfortunately not included in this analysis, have incorporated the importance of family
issues in their party programme. They explicitly argue that marriage is between a man and a
woman and that they are against same-sex relations. The Finnish PS also argues that they are
against same-sex relationships (Arter 2012). The Dutch PVV, on the other hand, argue that they
are liberal defenders of gay rights (Morris 2014). It is interesting that the results from Model
5 empirically support the separation of gay rights from grid, but it is also interesting that the
results do not point in a direction that can be linked to Pim Fortuyn and the background for
re-theorizing the political space.
Model 5.1 is the final model for this analysis and will be used to examine the seven West
European countries that are being compared. The independent variables will be the same for
each model. The dependent variable are uniquely constructed for each country where the major
parties as well as non-voters are being compared with the country’s populist radical right party.
Comparing both parties inside each country and comparing countries with each other will create
a clearer picture of the three-dimensional political space.
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5.2 Results from multinomial logistic regression analyses
In this section I present and discuss the results for the seven Western European countries included
in this thesis. The models presented in this section compare voters of populist radical right
parties with voters of the major parties, as well as non-voters for each country. The models
examine if the three dimensions as well as the gay rights-issue contribute to distinguish the
voters of populist radical right parties from the voters of the other mainstream parties. I first
present the results from the four Nordic countries: Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. I
expect these countries to have similar results. Thereafter, I present the results from the three
remaining countries: Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands.
5.2.1 Norway
Table 5.2 represents the results estimated by multinomial logistic regression analysis to test the
hypotheses. The model examines if the attitudes constructing the three dimensions contribute
to distinguish voters of Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) from the other mainstream parties in Norway.
I chose to use the four parties that received the most votes and in that way also had the most
respondents. In addition to comparing FrP-voters with the voters of the mainstream parties, I
also compare them to the non-voters 2. The parties that are being compared to FrP in table 5.2
are the conservative party Høyre (H), the social democratic labour party Arbeiderpartiet (AP),
the centrist and agrarian party Senterpartiet (SP), and the Christian democratic party Kristelig
Folkeparti (KrF). This results in a dependent variable with 6 categories. Respondents who
voted for other parties than those mentioned here were excluded from the analysis. In total 169
respondents were excluded from the analysis because they either voted for another party that
will not be included in the model, or because they did not remember what party they voted for.
In this thesis I am primarily interested in discovering if the attitudes constructing the three-
dimensional political space are necessary to explain the pattern of populist radical right voting.
The multinomial logit model examines the log odds of voting for FrP rather than any of the other
mainstream parties presented in the model, as well as being a non-voter on the three dimensions,
greed, group and grid, as well as gay rights.
The results for the case of Norway is presented in table 5.2. The independent variables (the
attitudes constructing the three dimensions in addition to the gay rights-variable) is listed in the
2The non-voters in this thesis constitutes all the respondents who answered that they did not vote. Those
respondents who did not remember what party they had voted for was coded as missing values.
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left column together with the model estimation (LR Chi2, pseudo R2 and AIC). The coefficients
reported in the model are log odds. These will only be interpreted as predicted probabilities in
the further analysis. The model also includes the standard error for each independent variable 3.
Table 5.2: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Norway
AP-voters SP-voters KRF-voters H-voters Non-voters
compared to compared to compared to compared to compared to
FrP-voters FrP-voters FrP-voters FrP-voters FrP-voters
Greed -.835 -2.44 .430 1.83*** .077
(.665) (1.01) (.927) (.646) (.644)
Group -7.10*** -3.11*** -6.21*** -5.70*** -5.34***
(.738) (.957) (1.03) (.753) (.720)
Grid .737 -.095 .088 .192 .792
(.651) (.898) (.963) (.667) (.647)
Gay rights -.117 1.06 3.03*** -.126 -.287
(.467) (.579) (.569) (.487) (.464)
Constant 4.39*** 1.41 1.47 3.261*** 3.39***
(.557) (.744) (.793) (.569) (.552)
N=1352
LR Chi2 230.47
Pseudo R2 0.0538
AIC 4100.577
Standard errors in parentheses
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
The results from table 5.2 support Kitschelt’s re-theorization of the political space. The
results from the Norwegian case demonstrate that it is necessary to separate group and grid.
While the effect of group is strong and substantial among the FrP-voters, the effect of grid is not.
The FrP-voters are to the right of the other voters on the group-dimension, but not distinct from
the other voters on the grid-dimension.
The results from table 5.2 demonstrate that FrP is the dominant choice for voters who
hold exclusionary attitudes on the group-dimension. When compared to the voters of all the
other parties, including those who did not vote, FrP is the dominant party in mobilizing these
voters. The voters of FrP is to the right of all the other voters on the group-dimension. Having
standardized the variables make it possible to compare the coefficients. It is worth noticing that
the coefficient of the group-dimension is several times larger than the other coefficients.
The results for the economic greed-dimension demonstrate that FrP is not the dominant
choice of voters who hold market-liberal values. The results demonstrate that the conservative
Høyre is the dominant choice of these voters. The voters of FrP is widely spread across the
greed-dimension, and cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other mainstream parties.
3Standard errors of more than 2 can indicate multicollinearity between the independent variables in the model. I
will not discuss this in the further analysis unless there is a problem. The standard errors are presented in parentheses
for each of the following models.
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Kitschelt and McGann (1995: 145) found that FrP-voters could be placed to the right of all the
other voters but H in the two-dimensional framework. My results demonstrate that FrP-voters
are to the left of the conservative voters, but not to the right of the voters of the other mainstream
parties.
The results demonstrate that we get important analytical leverage from separating group
and grid. The insignificant results for grid emphasize the importance of separating the two
dimensions. FrP-voters are not distinct from the voters of any of the other mainstream parties, as
well as the non-voters on the grid-dimension. Kitschelt (2012) argued that by separating group
and grid we could discover that populist radical right parties are intensifying their group appeal,
while they are letting go of some of their positions on grid. This argument is supported by the
results from Norway. The FrP-voters are mobilized by a strong group appeal, but are widely
scattered across the grid-dimension and in that way not distinct from other voters on grid issues.
The results from table 5.2 also demonstrate that FrP is not the dominant choice for voters
who hold opposing attitudes towards same-sex relationships. The results demonstrate that KrF
is better at mobilizing these voters. The FrP voters are not distinct from the voters of the other
mainstream parties on the gay rights-issue. The results give empirical support in separating the
gay rights-issue from the grid-dimension as suggested by principal components analysis. In the
binary model with the dichotomous dependent variable4, group was the only variable separating
FrP-voters from the voters of the other parties. The results from multinomial logistic regression
analysis supports this finding. The voters of FrP are significantly to the right of all other voters
on the group-dimension, but not distinct form the other voters on any of the other dimensions.
On the greed-dimension the FrP voters serve as a contrast to the conservative voters, and on the
gay rights-issue FrP voters serve as a contrast to the Christian democratic voters. The results
demonstrate that group clearly is the important dimension, but they also demonstrate that grid
does not belong together with group, and that the gay rights-issue should be treated separately
from grid. The results emphasizes the importance of separating the political space into three
dimensions. Although all the three dimensions do not have an independent and significant effect
in the Norwegian case, it accentuates that issues at the grid-dimension might not be as important
as previous research has argued.
Kitschelt (2012: 245) emphasized that the re-theorization of the political space into three
dimensions can make it possible to discover variations of populist radical right parties. This
4The results from the binary logistic regression model with the dichotomous dependent variable can be found in
the appendix.
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thesis will not try to discover different variants of populist radical right parties. I will, however,
use his classification of the parties of being to the right of, to the left of and not distinct from,
to summarize the results from table 5.2. The model below uses five different classifications for
each variable. The column to the left (– –) is used if the PRR-voters are further to the left on one
dimension than all the other voters they are being compared to. The second column to the left (–)
is used if the PRR-voters are to the right of one other party, but not distinct from the voters of
the other parties. The column in the middle (=) is used when the voters are not distinct from the
voters of the other mainstream parties with no significant results, or if they are both to the left of
and to the right of the other mainstream parties and can be placed at the centre of the dimension.
The two columns to the right (+ and ++) represent voters to the right of one or some of the other
mainstream parties (+) and to the right of all of the other mainstream parties (++).
Norway – – – = + + +
Greed X
Group X
Grid X
Gay rights X
Looking at the model above, it is clear that the group-dimension is the most important in
explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting in Norway. The greed-dimension, grid-
dimension and gay rights-issue, does not separate the voters of Fremskrittspartiet from the voters
of the other mainstream parties in Norway.
5.2.2 Denmark
The methodological approach for the Danish case is the same as for the Norwegian case. In
addition to the DF I have chosen the four mainstream parties of the left and right, as well as
the non-voters and created a dependent categorical variable. The parties that are included in
this model are the Social democratic Socialdemokraterne (SDd)5, the Liberal party Venstre (V),
the socialist party Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF), and the Conservative party Det Konservative
Folkeparti (K). The voters who voted for the remaining Danish parties were excluded from
the analysis together with those who did not remember what party they voted for. In total 327
respondents were excluded from the analysis.
The results presented in table 5.3 are similar to those from the Norwegian case. Only two of
the three dimensions have an independent and significant effect on the probability of voting for
5The original abbrevation for the Socialdemokraterne is SD, but having already included an SD (Sverigedemokra-
terna) earlier it is necessary to separate them. I therefore added a ”d” for Denmark.
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the DF compared to the other mainstream parties in Denmark. Again, the results demonstrate the
importance of separating group and grid. In Denmark, the DF is clearly the dominant choice
for voters who hold exclusionary attitudes on the group-dimension, while the voters are not
distinct from any of the other voters on the grid-dimension. The results also give added insight
from including the gay rights-issue. While the DF-voters are to the right of the voters of the
social democrats and the socialists, they are not distinct from the voters of the liberals and the
conservatives on the gay rights-issue.
Table 5.3: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Denmark
SF-voters SD-voters V-voters K-voters Non-voters
compared to compared to compared to compared to compared to
DF-voters DF-voters DF-voters DF-voters DF-voters
Greed -3.09*** -2.00*** 1.59** 3.24*** .146
(.890) (.707) (.641) (.899) (.702)
Group -8.18*** -6.96*** -5.35*** -5.92*** -6.84***
(.854) (.715) (.685) (1.01) (.739)
Grid -1.06 -.098 .787 -.651 -.231
(.883) (.782) (.770) (1.09) (.805)
Gay rights -2.54*** -1.22* .005 -.922 -.555
(.807) (.557) (.489) (.895) (.558)
Constant 5.72*** 5.26*** 3.01*** 1.97* 4.45***
(.712) (.645) (.629) (.862) (.658)
N=1162
LR Chi2 301.77
Pseudo R2 0.0793
AIC 3554.641
Standard errors in parentheses
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
In the starting breakthrough of Dansk Folkeparti the mobilizing characteristic of the DF-
voters, compared to voters of other parties, was on the economic dimension (Andersen 1992: 199).
The results from table 5.3 demonstrate that Dansk Folkeparti is not the dominant party of those
voters who hold market-liberal attitudes on the economic greed-dimension. The conservatives
and the liberals are better at mobilizing these voters. The results also demonstrate that the DF-
voters are to the right of the social democratic voters and of the socialist voters. The DF-voters
are located to the centre of the economic greed-dimension by being to the left of the mainstream
parties of the right, and to the right of the mainstream parties of the left. The overall probability
of voting for the DF based on the greed-dimension alone, is around 9 percent.
The results from table 5.3 demonstrate that group is the most important dimension for
explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting in Denmark. The results demonstrate
that DF-voters are to the right of all the other mainstream parties, as well as non voters on
the group-dimension. The predicted probability of voting for the DF ranges from 0 and 68
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percentage points for low (0) and high (1) values on the group-index. The group-dimension is
both statistically and substantially important for populist radical right voting in Denmark.
As for the Norwegian case, the grid-dimension does not have an independent and significant
effect on the probability of voting for the DF rather than any of the other mainstream parties.
The predicted probability of voting for the DF based on the grid dimension alone is 9 percent
regardless of low or high values on the grid-index. The DF-voters are widely scattered across
the grid-dimension and cannot be distinguished from the voters of any of the other mainstream
parties, as well as from the non-voters. The results demonstrate that we gain important analytical
leverage from separating group and grid, and that in previous research the importance of group
may have camouflaged the insignificance of grid (Kitschelt and McGann 1995).
In the public debate, DF has gained attention for being homophobic (Larsen 2014). It could
therefore be expected that the voters hold some of the same attitudes as those that are being
profiled in the media. The results from table 5.3 demonstrate that the DF-voters are to the right
of the socialist and social democratic voters. The DF-voters are almost identical to the Liberal
voters on the gay rights-issue, and not distinct from the conservative voters or the non-voters.
The predicted probability of voting for the DF when all other attitudes are at its mean, varies
between 8 and 13 percent for low (0) and high (1) values on the gay rights-variable. The results
give empirical leverage for separating the gay rights-issue from the grid-dimension, but neither
the grid-dimension or the gay rights-issue separate the voters of Dansk Folkeparti from all the
other voters. Only the group-dimension is able to distinguish the DF-voters from the voters of
all the other mainstream parties in Denmark.
The model below summarizes the results from table 5.3 in the same way as for the Norwegian
case. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used if the DF-voters are different in the left or
right direction from one or some of the other voters, or if they can be placed at the centre of
the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left and right (– – and ++) are being used if
the DF-voters can be distinguished either to the left or the right from all the other voters of the
mainstream parties.
Denmark – – – = + + +
Greed X
Group X
Grid X
Gay rights X
When summarizing the results, it is clear that the group-dimension is the dominant dimension
in mobilizing voters for Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, as it was in the binary model. While the
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DF-voters can be placed at the centre in the greed-dimension, the voters are not distinguishable
from any of the other voters in the grid-dimension. The results give important additional insight
for separating the gay rights-issue from the grid-dimension. The DF-voters are to the right of the
socialist and social democratic voters on the gay rights-issue, but cannot be distinguished from
the voters of the other parties, nor the non-voters on this issue. The only dimension that actually
mobilizes voters to vote for the DF, is the group-dimension.
5.2.3 Sweden
For the Swedish case the mainstream parties that are included in the model are the social
democratic party Socialdemokratiska Arbeiderpartiet (SAP), the liberal conservative party Mod-
eraterna (M), the liberal party Folkepartiet liberalerna (FP), and the green party Miljo¨partiet de
gro¨na (MP). This results in a dependent variable with 6 categories. Respondents who voted for
other parties than those mentioned here were excluded from the analysis. In total 279 respondents
were excluded from the analysis because they either voted for another party that will not be
included in the model, or because they did not remember what party they voted for. Kriesi et al.
(2008) treat the green parties in Western Europe as the opposite of the populist radical right, so
to be able to include the green party (MP) in Sweden is an interesting contribution.
The results presented in table 5.4 are very similar to the results for the cases of Norway and
Denmark. The results demonstrate that we gain important analytical leverage in separating group
and grid. The SD-voters are further to the right than any of the voters of the other mainstream
parties, as well as the non-voters on the group-dimension, while they cannot be distinguished
from any of the other voters on the grid-dimension. As for the Danish case, we gain important
additional information by including the gay rights-issue separately.
The results from table 5.4 demonstrate that the SD is not the dominant choice for voters
who hold market-liberal attitudes on the economic greed-dimension. The conservative party
Moderaterna is better in mobilizing these voters. The results also demonstrate that the SD is not
the dominant choice for voters holding redistributive attitudes at the economic greed-dimension.
The social democratic SAP is better at mobilizing voters who hold redistributive attitudes. The
predicted probability of voting for the SD based on the greed-index alone is approximately
4 percent, regardless of the different values of greed. The results demonstrate that SD-voters
cannot be distinguished from the green, liberal and non-voters on the greed-dimension. As for
the Danish case, the voters of Sverigedemokraterna can be placed at the centre of the economic
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Table 5.4: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Sweden
MP-voters SAP-voters FP-voters M-voters Non-voters
compared to compared to compared to compared to compared to
SD-voters SD-voters SD-voters SD-voters SD-voters
Greed -1.54 -2.95*** .436 1.68* .162
(1.05) (.910) (.992) (.862) (.892)
Group -11.1*** -7.91*** -9.81*** -8.84*** -8.02***
(1.13) (.927) (1.12) (.948) (.962)
Grid .413 .310 -.414 .138 .458
(.973) (.858) (.985) (.865) (.884)
Gay rights -4.78*** -1.11 -1.78* -2.08*** -1.35
(.978) (.689) (.864) (.719) (.723)
Constant 6.58*** 6.41*** 5.86*** 6.29*** 5.52***
(.837) (.772) (.845) (.775) (.787)
N=1369
LR Chi2 315.90***
Pseudo R2 0.0724
AIC 4095.908
Standard errors in parentheses
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
dimension.
Looking at the group-index, it is clear that SD-voters are significantly more exclusionary
when compared to voters of all the other mainstream parties in Sweden, as well as non-voters.
The group-dimension is the most important for mobilizing voters to vote for the SD. Looking at
the group-index alone, the predicted probability of voting for the SD ranges from 0 on the extreme
inclusive axis (0) to 74 percent on the extreme exclusionary axis (1). The results demonstrate
that the SD is the dominant party for mobilizing voters on the exclusionary group-dimension,
and the most important in explaining the voting pattern of the Swedish populist radical right
voters.
The results from table 5.4 demonstrate, in the same way as for the Norwegian and Danish
cases, that we get important analytical leverage in separating group and grid. The voters of the SD
are widely scattered across the grid-dimension and cannot be distinguished from any of the other
mainstream voters, nor non-voters. The overall predicted probability of voting for the SD, based
on the grid-dimension alone, is around 4 percent. I find it surprising that the grid-dimension has
no effect in the Swedish case. Some of the issues included in the grid-dimension are actually
embedded in the logo of the SD. The party clearly stands for Safety & Tradition, two important
issues captured by the grid-index in this analysis. The issues constructing the grid-dimension
are also central issues in the programme of principles of the SD (Sverigedemokraterna 2011). It
is therefore interesting that the SD-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of any of the
other mainstream parties on the grid-dimension.
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The results from the Swedish case demonstrate that we gain important additional insight by
including the gay rights-variable in the regression model. The SD-voters are to the right of the
voters of the conservative party, the green party, and the liberal party in Sweden. The SD-voters
cannot be distinguished from the voters of the social democrats or the non-voters on the gay
rights-issue. In the cross-country binary regression models Sweden was the only case where the
gay rights-issue clearly played a part. The multinomial regression results support this finding.
Overall, the predicted probability of voting for the SD, based on the gay rights-variable alone,
ranges from 3 percent to 11 percent from the lowest (0) to the highest (1) values on the gay
rights-variable. While the overall probability of voting for the SD was 4 percent based on both
the greed and the grid-dimensions regardless of the different values on the scale, the results from
table 5.4 demonstrate important additional insight by separating the gay rights-issue from the
grid-dimension.
The Swedish public debate has often categorized the SD as being a single-issue party.
Erlingsson, Vernby, and O¨hrvall (2014) found that this is not the case neither from a supply
or demand side perspective. They argue that the SD mobilize voters on more than just the
immigration issue. The results from table 5.4 demonstrate that voters are only mobilized to vote
for the SD by the group-issues. However, the results also demonstrate that the gay rights-issue
plays some part. More importantly, the results demonstrate that grid and group-issues should be
treated as belonging to separate dimensions, and that we also gain important additional insight in
separating the gay rights-issue from the grid-dimension.
The model below, summarizes the results from table 5.4 in the same way as for the Norwegian
and Danish case. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used if the SD-voters are different in the
left or right direction from one or some of the other voters, or if they can be placed at the centre
of the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left and right (– – and ++) are being used
if the SD-voters can be distinguished either to the left or the right from all the other voters of the
mainstream parties.
Sweden – – – = + + +
Greed X
Group X
Grid X
Gay rights X
Summarizing the results from table 5.4, the placement of SD-voters in the three-dimensional
political space is identical to that of the DF-voters. The voters of the SD can be placed in the
centre of the economic greed-dimension, and to the right in the group-dimension, being more
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exclusionary than the voters of the other mainstream parties. The voters cannot be distinguished
from the voters of the other mainstream parties on the grid-dimension and is therefore placed at
the centre. While being to the right of some of the other parties at the gay rights-issue, the voters
of the SD is placed to the right, but not to the far-right, on the gay rights-issue. The summary of
the voting patterns for the Swedish case are very similar to what was found in the binary models,
where group played the biggest part, but closely followed by the gay rights-issue.
5.2.4 Finland
The largest mainstream parties that was chosen to represent the Finish case are the liberal
conservative party Kansallinen Kokoomus r.p (Kok), the social democratic party Suomen
Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (SDP), the centrist, agrarian and liberal party Suomen Keskusta
(Kesk), and the green liberal party Vihrea¨ liitto (Vihr). This results in a dependent variable with
6 categories. Respondents who voted for other parties than those mentioned here were excluded
from the analysis. In total 350 respondents were excluded from the analysis because they either
voted for another party that will not be included in the model, or because they did not remember
what party they voted for. The voters of these parties are, as in the previous models, being
compared to the voters of the populist radical right party.
The results from table 5.5 demonstrate that the Finnish Perussuomalaiset most definitely can
and should be included in the populist radical right party family as suggested by Jungar and
Jupska˚s (2014). The results demonstrate that group is the dominant dimension for mobilizing
voters to vote for the PS, same as for the other Nordic countries. The results also give important
analytical leverage for separating group from grid, but in a different way than for the other
Nordic countries.
The results from table 5.5 demonstrate that the PS is, as for the other Nordic countries, not the
dominant choice for voters who hold market-liberal attitudes at the economic greed-dimension.
The conservative party Kok is better at mobilizing voters on the greed-dimension. The results
also demonstrate that those who did not vote are more market-liberal on economic issues, than
the PS voters. Looking at the greed-index with all other variables at its mean, the predicted
probability of voting for the PS varies between 14 (0) and 3 (1) percent for low and high values
on the greed-index. This is a different result than for the other Nordic countries where the
predicted probability was consistent for the different values. However, the PS-voters cannot
be distinguished from the voters of the social democrats, liberal agrarian, and green parties in
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Table 5.5: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Finland
Vihr-voters SDP-voters Kesk-voters Kok-voters Non-voters
compared to compared to compared to compared to compared to
PS-voters PS-voters PS-voters PS-voters PS-voters
Greed -.353 -.361 1.03 3.12*** 1.58***
(.804) (.672) (.661) (.591) (.557)
Group -6.99*** -4.35*** -3.71*** -6.62*** -3.49***
(.833) (.681) (.714) (.678) (.599)
Grid -1.70** 1.33* 1.85*** 1.11* .213
(.699) (.607) (.641) (.580) (.533)
Gay rights -4.22*** -.767* .500 -.426 -.448
(.677) (.378) (.369) (.360) (.323)
Constant 4.69*** 1.82*** .352 2.49*** 2.41***
(.565) (.523) (.558) (.498) (.466)
N=1712
LR Chi2 370.39
Pseudo R2 0.0633
AIC 5532.892
Standard errors in parentheses
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Finland.
As for the Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish cases, the group-index has the strongest effect
in the Finnish case. The predicted probability of voting for the populist radical right in Finland
varies between 1 percent and 54 percent for low (0) and high (1) values of group. The results
demonstrate that the PS is the dominant choice for voters who hold exclusionary attitudes at
the group-dimension. The PS voters can be distinguished from the voters of all of the other
mainstream parties as belonging to the right side of the group-dimension.
Deviant from the three previous cases, the grid-dimension has an independent and significant
effect in the Finnish case. It has a statistically significant effect for all parties compared to
PS-voters, except for the non-voters. The coefficients have both positive and negative directions
and give important empirical leverage for separating group and grid. The voters of the PS
can be placed to the left of the voters of the conservative Kok, social democratic SDP, and
agrarian liberal Kesk. They can also be placed to the right of the voters of the green Vihr-party.
The PS-voters can, however, not be distinguished from the non-voters on the grid-dimension.
Looking at the grid-index alone, the probability of voting for the PS varies between 15 and 9
percent for low (0) and high (1) values on the grid-index. The results from table 5.5 indicate
that the PS-voters can be placed at the centre of the grid-dimension. The Finnish case gives
important support for Kitschelt’s re-theorization of the political space where voters can be both
to the right on the group-dimension and to the left at the grid-dimension when compared to the
voters of other mainstream parties.
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The results from table 5.5 also support the separation of the grid-dimension and the gay
rights-issue. Comparing the voters of PS to the voters of SDP serves as an important example.
On the greed-dimension these voters cannot be distinguished from each other, but at the group-
dimension, PS-voters can be placed to the right of the SDP-voters. On the grid-dimension,
PS-voters can be placed to the left of the SDP-voters, and finally, on the gay rights-issue, PS
voters can be placed at the right of the SDP-voters. The PS-voters can also be placed to the
right of the green voters, but cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other mainstream
parties on the gay rights-issue. Although all parties support traditional and secure family patterns
(Fremskrittspartiet 2009; Sverigedemokraterna 2011; DF 2012), the PS is the only Nordic
populist radical right party that have the opposition against same-sex partnership embedded in
their party manifesto (Arter 2012: 815). The results for the gay rights-issue do not indicate that
the PS mobilizes voters on this issue. Only that they are different when compared to some of the
other voters, and that it cannot be merged with the grid-dimension.
The model below summarizes the voting patterns from table 5.5 in the same way as for the
previous cases. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used if the PS-voters are different in the
left or right direction from one or some of the other voters, or if they can be placed at the centre
of the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left and right (– – and ++) are being used
if the PS-voters can be distinguished either to the left or the right from all the other voters of the
mainstream parties.
Finland – – – = + + +
Greed X
Group X
Grid X
Gay rights X
Summarizing the results based on table 5.5 the placement of the PS-voters in the three-
dimensional political space is different from the other Nordic cases. As for the Norwegian case,
the PS can be placed to the left of the conservative party, but cannot be distinguished from
the other voters on the economic greed-dimension. Identical to the other cases, the PS-voters
are significantly more exclusionary on the group-dimension than the voters of all the other
mainstream parties and can be placed further to the right on the group-dimension. On the
grid-dimension the PS-voters can be placed both to the right of, and to the left of, the other
mainstream parties. It is therefore fair to say that the PS-voters are located at the centre of the
grid-dimension. Finally, on the gay rights-issue, the PS-voters can be placed to the right of
social democratic and green voters, but cannot be distinguished from the conservative and liberal
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voters. The results from the Finnish case demonstrate that we gain important empirical insight
from conducting a multinomial and not just a binary logistic regression analysis. In the binary
model, only the group-dimension was able to distinguish the PS-voters. Although this is also the
case with the multinomial regression results, we gain important information about the direction
of the results when they are compared to the different parties.
5.2.5 Switzerland
The major parties representing the Swiss case for this thesis are the socialist left party Sozialdemo-
kratische Partei der Schweiz (SPs)6, the liberal party FDP. Die Liberalen (FDP), the Christian
democratic party Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP), and the green party Gru¨ne Partei
der Schweiz (GPS). For the previous cases, this results in a dependent variable with 6 categories.
Respondents who voted for other parties than those mentioned here were excluded from the
analysis. In total 231 respondents were excluded from the analysis because they either voted
for another party that will not be included in the model, or because they did not remember what
party they voted for.
Based on the results from table 5.6, Switzerland represents a unique case. The results indicate
that the SVP-voters are to the right of the other voters on the economic greed-dimension, to the
right of all the other voters of the mainstream parties on the group-dimension, and to the right of
some, but not all voters on the grid-dimension, when compared to voters of other mainstream
parties in Switzerland. In addition, although the results support separating the gay rights-issue
from grid, we do not gain any added information from including the gay rights-issue in the
regression model.
Green parties are often regarded as the counter image of populist radical right parties (Kriesi
et al. 2008). In the case of Swiss voters, the SVP-voters can be regarded as opposites from
the green GPS-voters. The SVP-voters are to the right of the green voters on all dimensions,
including the gay rights-issue. The coefficients are also strong when compared to the results of
the other parties. The coefficients of group and grid are strongest when SVP-voters are compared
to the GPS-voters.
The results from table 5.6 demonstrate that the SVP is better to mobilize voters on the greed-
dimension than the other mainstream parties, except for the liberal FDP. The SVP-voters can be
6The original abbrevation for the Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz is SP, but having already included an
SP earlier it is necessary to separate them. I therefore added an ”s” for Switzerland.
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Table 5.6: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Switzerland
GPS-voters SPs-voters FDP-voters CVP-voters Non-voters
compared to compared to compared to compared to compared to
SVP-voters SVP-voters SVP-voters SVP-voters SVP-voters
Greed -2.50** -2.64*** .924 -1.86* -1.72***
(1.01) (.860) (.751) (.808) (.597)
Group -7.01*** -6.85*** -4.73*** -4.49*** -4.15***
(1.08) (.924) (.907) (.864) (.670)
Grid -4.49*** -4.27*** -1.39 -1.02 -2.76***
(1.06) (.949) (.987) (.968) (.767)
Gay rights -2.28** -.632 -.638 .874 -.054
(.883) (.619) (.604) (.524) (.429)
Constant 6.71*** 6.82*** 3.23*** 3.14*** 6.11***
(.844) (.784) (.838) (.831) (.675)
N=1104
LR Chi2 205.69
Pseudo R2 0.0655
AIC 2986.442
Standard errors in parentheses
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
placed to the right of the voters of the other mainstream parties on the economic dimension, but
not further to the right than of the FDP-voters. The predicted probability of voting for the SVP
based on the greed-dimension alone ranges from 8 to 21 percent for low (0) and high (1) values
of the greed-index. Based on these results the greed-dimension plays a bigger part in populist
radical right voting in Switzerland, than in any of the Nordic countries.
Although the coefficients representing all of the three dimensions are quite strong, the
strongest effect is found for the group-dimension. Comparing voters for each individual party
with the SVP-voters, the group-index is the most important in each case. Looking at the group-
index, it is clear that SVP-voters are significantly more to the right when compared to voters
for all other mainstream parties in Switzerland, as well as non-voters. The group-dimension is
the most important for mobilizing voters to vote for the SVP. The probability of voting for the
SVP based on the group-index is 1 percent for low (0) values and 49 percent for the highest (1)
value. This is lower than for the Nordic countries. What is unique for the Swiss case, is that all
the three dimensions have a quite substantial effect on the probability of voting for the populist
radical right.
The results from table 5.6 give important analytical leverage for separating group and grid.
The results demonstrate that the SVP-voters can be placed to the right of socialist, green, and
non-voters, but that they cannot be distinguished from the liberal and Christian democratic voters.
The predicted probability of voting for the SVP based on the grid-dimension alone, ranges from
2 to 19 percent for low (0) and high (1) values. This is a substantial growth in percent compared
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to the results form the Nordic cases. The results place the SVP-voters to the right of the socialist,
green and non-voters, but the SVP-voters cannot be distinguished from the liberal and Christian
democratic voters on the grid-dimension.
Finally, the results also support separating the gay rights-varaible from the grid-dimension.
The result is only significant when compared to the green GPS-voters. Looking at the predicted
probabilities alone, the probability of voting for the SVP based on the gay rights-variable is 11
percent regardless of the different values on the gay rights-variable. This makes it clear that the
gay rights-issue is not important for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting in
Switzerland. The variable only serves as a contrast when comparing the SVP-voters with the
green voters, but does not give any additional analytical insight.
Lachat (2008) found that voters in Switzerland were structured along two dimensions- the
economic, and the cultural. The results from table 5.6 support that voters are mobilized to vote for
the SVP based on both economic and cultural issues. However, the results also demonstrate that
the political space is more complex than what is argued by Lachat (2008). Issues representing
grid and group do not belong together. The results support Kitschelt’s re-theorization of the
political space into three dimensions. It also supports separating the gay rights-issue from the
grid-dimension.
The model below summarizes the voting patterns from table 5.6 in the same way as for the
previous cases. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used if the SD-voters are different in the
left or right direction from one or some of the other voters, or if they can be placed at the centre
of the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left and right (– – and ++) are being used
if the SD-voters can be distinguished either to the left or the right from all the other voters of the
mainstream parties.
Switzerland – – – = + + +
Greed X
Group X
Grid X
Gay rights X
Summarizing the results from table 5.6 it is clear that the populist radical right voters in
Switzerland stand out from the previously examined Nordic voters. As for the Nordic cases,
the group-dimension is the dominant dimension for mobilizing voters to the SVP. However, the
greed-dimension also stands out where the SVP-voters are placed to the right of all other voters
except for the liberal FDP-voters. On the grid-dimension the SVP-voters can be placed to the
right of the socialist, green, and non-voters, but cannot be distinguished from the voters of the
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remaining parties. Finally, on the gay rights-issue, the SVP-voters can be placed to the right of
the green voters, but cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other parties, or the non-voters.
As for the Finnish case, the results from table 5.6 demonstrate that we gain important empirical
insight from conducting a multinomial and not just a binary logistic regression analysis. In the
binary model, both group and grid was able to distinguish the SVP-voters. In the multinomial
model we gained additional insight for the economic greed-dimension, as well as being able to
distinguish the SVP-voters from only some of the other voters on the grid-dimension.
5.2.6 Flanders
The major parties chosen to represent the Flemish case are the Christian democratic party
Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V), the socialist party Socialistische Partij Anders
(SP.a), the liberal party Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (VLD), and the green party Groen!.
This results in a dependent variable with 6 categories. Respondents who voted for other parties
than those mentioned here were excluded from the analysis. In total 413 respondents were
excluded from the analysis because they either voted for another party that will not be included
in the model, or because they did not remember what party they voted for.
The results for the case of Flanders stand out from the previously discussed results. Flanders
is the only case where the greed-dimension has no effect on the probability of voting. In Flanders,
the VB-voters are not distinct from any of the other voters of the mainstream left and right on
the greed-dimension. As for the previous cases, the group-dimension is the dominant dimension
for mobilizing voters to the VB. The results also support Kitschelt’s re-theorization of the
separation of group and grid. The VB-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other
mainstream parties on the grid-dimension, except as a contrast when compared with the green
voters. Deviant from the previous cases, the gay rights-issue does not offer any additional insight
when separated from grid.
The results from table 5.7 demonstrate that the VB-voters are widely scattered across the
greed-dimension. The results indicate that the VB-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters
of any of the other mainstream parties on the greed-dimension. The predicted probability of
voting for the VB based on the greed-dimension alone is around 5 percent, regardless of low (0)
and high (1) values. The greed-dimension does not have any effect on the probability of voting
for the VB, and the voters cannot be distinguished to the left or the right of any of the voters of
the other mainstream parties.
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Table 5.7: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Flanders
Groen!- SP.a- VLD- CD&V- Non-
voters voters voters voters voters
compared to compared to compared to compared to compared to
VB-voters VB-voters VB-voters VB-voters VB-voters
Greed -1.61 -.860 1.50 .655 .221
(1.35) (1.09) (1.04) (1.01) (1.00)
Group -9.90*** -5.67*** -5.49*** -4.55*** -6.28***
(1.36) (1.01) (1.02) (.947) (.952)
Grid -4.38*** -.229 1.27 1.50 .687
(1.38) (1.20) (1.21) (1.15) (1.13)
Gay rights -.457 -1.07 -1.22 -.701 -.200
(.954) (.739) (.737) (.669) (.652)
Constant 7.83*** 4.54*** 3.01*** 2.86*** 4.51***
(1.09) (1.00) (1.01) (.977) (.960)
N=825
LR Chi2 148.86
Pseudo R2 0.0548
AIC 2619.209
Standard errors in parentheses
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Although the most important mission of the Vlaams Belang is to establish an independent
Flemish state to preserve their Flemish nationalism, rejecting multiculturalism is also an impor-
tant issue in their party manifesto (VB 2014). Looking at the results from table 5.7, it is clear
that the group-dimension is the dominant factor for mobilizing voters to the VB in Flanders. The
coefficients are several times stronger than those representing the greed- grid- and gay rights-
issues. The predicted probability of voting for the VB based on the group-dimension alone ranges
from 0 to 46 percent for the lowest (0) and highest (1) values. Based on the results from table 5.7,
the VB is the dominant choice for voters who hold exclusionary values on the group-dimension.
The VB-voters can be placed to the right of the voters of all the other mainstream parties on
issues belonging to the group-dimension.
The results from table 5.7 demonstrate that we get important analytical leverage for separating
group and grid. The VB-voters cannot be distinguished from the other voters of the mainstream
parties in Flanders, other than as a contrast with the green voters. The results indicate that the
VB-voters are widely scattered across the grid-dimension. The predicted probability of voting
for the VB based on the grid-index alone is 6 percent, regardless of the different values on
the grid-dimension. The values representing the grid-dimension are well represented in the
manifesto of Vlaams Belang. They argue for strict authority and the importance of living in
secure surroundings as well as protecting family traditions (VB 2014). It is therefore interesting
that the grid-dimension does not play a bigger part when structuring voters in the political space.
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In the Nordic cases, and especially the Finnish case, we gained important additional insight
from separating the gay rights-issue from the grid-dimension. The results from table 5.7 serve as
a contrast to this. The predicted probability of voting for the VB based on the gay rights-variable
alone ranges from 5 to 9 percent for low (0) and high (1) values on the gay rights-variable. The
overall probability is low and does not give added insight beyond that of the grid-dimension.
The VB-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of any of the other parties on the gay
rights-issue alone.
When summarizing the results, it is clear that group constitutes the dominant factor in voting
for the VB compared to other parties in Flanders. The model below summarizes the results from
table 5.7 in the same way as for the previous cases. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used
if the VB-voters are different in the left or right direction from one or some of the other voters,
or if they can be placed at the centre of the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left
and right (– – and ++) are being used if the VB-voters can be distinguished either to the left or
the right from all the other voters of the mainstream parties.
Flanders – – – = + + +
Greed X
Group X
Grid X
Gay rights X
Summarizing the voting patterns from table 5.7, only the group-dimension can be used to
distinguish the voters of the Vlaams Belang from the voters of the other mainstream parties in
Flanders. The VB-voters can be placed to the right of all other voters in table 5.7, but they are
not distinct from any of the other voters on the greed-dimension and the gay rights-issue. The
VB-voters can also not be distinguished from the other voters on the grid-dimension, except
when compared with the Groen!-voters in which the VB-voters are to the right. The results are
consistent with those from the binary model. In the Flemish case we did not gain any additional
insight from conducting a multinomial logistic regression model other than as a confirmation of
the results from the binary model.
5.2.7 The Netherlands
The final case to be presented in this thesis is the case of the Netherlands. The major par-
ties that have been chosen to represent the Dutch case are the Christian democratic Christen-
Democratische Partij (CDP), the conservative liberal party Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie
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(VVD), the socialist party Socialistische Partij (SPn)7, and the labour party Partij van de Arbeid
(PvdA). This results in a dependent variable with 6 categories. Respondents who voted for other
parties than those mentioned here were excluded from the analysis. In total 363 respondents
were excluded from the analysis because they either voted for another party that will not be
included in the model, or because they did not remember what party they voted for.
The results from table 5.8 demonstrate, as for the previous cases, that group is the dominant
factor for populist radical right voting in the Netherlands. The PVV-voters can be placed to the
right of the voters of all the other mainstream parties, as well as those who did not vote. The
results also demonstrate that we get important analytical leverage from separating group and grid,
but the results do not provide us with additional information when looking at the gay rights-issue
separately. Similar to the Danish case, the greed-index points in both positive and negative
directions when compared to the voters of the other mainstream parties. What is special for the
results in table 5.8 are the positive coefficients for both grid and gay rights when PVV-voters are
compared to the voters of the Christian democratic CDP.
Table 5.8: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Netherlands
SPn-voters PvdA-voters CDP-voters VVD-voters Non-voters
compared to compared to compared to compared to compared to
PVV-voters PVV-voters PVV-voters PVV-voters PVV-voters
Greed -3.68*** -2.36*** .804 2.32*** -.279
(.979) (.827) (.917) (.765) (.770)
Group -9.15*** -7.08*** -8.86*** -7.29*** -6.28***
(.919) (.842) (.981) (.808) (.781)
Grid -1.67 -.888 3.83*** 1.07 .139
(.900) (.820) (.986) (.814) (.797)
Gay rights .099 .172 1.70* .353 1.03
(.891) (.777) (.807) (.740) (.722)
Constant 5.97*** 7.02*** 1.88* 3.88*** 4.66***
(.789) (.732) (.861) (.721) (.713)
N=1354
LR Chi2 339.17
Pseudo R2 0.0754
AIC 4206.562
Standard errors in parentheses
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
The results from table 5.8 demonstrate that the probability of voting for the PVV based on
the economic greed-dimension varies significantly between parties. The results demonstrate that
Partij Voor de Vrihejd is not the dominant choice for voters who hold market-liberal attitudes
on the economic dimension. The VVD is better at mobilizing these voters than the populist
7The original abbrevation for the Socialistische Partij is SP, but having already included an SP earlier it is
necessary to separate them. I therefore added an ”n” for the Netherlands.
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radical right in the Netherlands. The overall probability of voting for the PVV based on the
greed-dimension alone, is 5 percent compared to 73 percent for the VVD-voters on the market-
liberal axis. The results from table 5.8 demonstrate that PVV-voters can be placed to the right
of the mainstream voters of the left and to the left of the VVD-voters, while they cannot be
distinguished from the Christian democratic and non-voters on the economic greed-dimension.
This places the PVV-voters at the centre on the greed-dimension.
As for the other six cases examined in this thesis, group is the dominant factor for mobilizing
voters to the PVV in the Dutch case. The predicted probabilities of voting for the PVV rather than
the other mainstream parties of the left and right, based on the group-dimension, ranges from 0
to 67 percent for the lowest (0) and highest (1) values on the group-index. The PVV-voters can
clearly be placed to the right of all the other voters on the group-dimension.
I will discuss the results for the grid-dimension and the gay rights-issue simultaneously
because they both have a positive and statistically significant coefficient when compared to the
same party. The results indicate that PVV-voters are to the left on the grid-dimension and on the
gay rights-issue when compared to voters of the CDP. The results are interesting because this
indicates that the PVV-voters follow some of the same attitudes as the Lijst Pim Fortuyn, where
one could expect to find liberal attitudes on the grid-dimension and the gay rights-issue. However,
the result only serves as a contrast when compared to the Christian democratic CDP, comparable
to the findings from the Norwegian case. The voters of the PVV cannot be distinguished from
the voters of the other mainstream parties, or the non-voters, on neither the grid-dimension or the
gay rights-issue. The predicted probability of voting for the PVV based on the grid-dimension
alone is quite low. The overall probability of voting for the PVV based on grid alone is 6 percent,
regardless of the different values of the grid-index. The results for the gay rights-issue is similar
and ranges from 7 to 4 percent depending on the values on the gay rights-variable. The PVV, like
Pim Fortuyn, openly defends the rights and liberties of people living in same-sex relationships
(Morris 2014). The results from table 5.8 demonstrate that we do not gain any added insight
from including the gay rights-variable in the regression model.
Muis and Scholte (2013) conclude their paper on populist radical right parties, trying to
find the winning formula in the case of Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands, that
immigration- and cultural issues are the most important in explaining the success of the party.
Kriesi and Frey (2008: 165) argue that attitudes constructing the cultural dimension were more
important for voting in the Netherlands than economic attitudes. The results from my analysis
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support Muis and Scholte (2013) and Kriesi and Frey (2008) from a perspective looking at the
populist radical right voters only. Economic attitudes are not important for voting PVV in the
Netherlands. The dominant motivator for PVV-voting is the attitudes constructing the group-
dimension. Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) argue that protest attitudes and the evaluation of
party leaders are important reasons to vote for the PVV in the 2006 and 2010 Dutch elections.
Although this analysis does not contain neither protest attitudes or the evaluation of party leaders,
the results from table 5.8 demonstrate that the picture is more complex than that. Voters are
structured along three dimensions where attitudes belonging to the group-dimension are the most
important.
The model below summarizes the voting patterns from table 5.8 in the same way as for the
previous cases. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used if the PVV-voters are different in the
left or right direction from one or some of the other voters, or if they can be placed at the centre
of the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left and right (– – and ++) are being used
if the PVV-voters can be distinguished either to the left or the right from all the other voters of
the mainstream parties.
The Netherlands – – – = + + +
Greed X
Group X
Grid X
Gay rights X
Summarizing the results from table 5.8, the placement of PVV-voters in the three-dimensional
political space is comparable to the previous cases. The voters of the PVV can be placed in
the centre of the economic greed-dimension and to the right at the group-dimension, being
more exclusionary than the voters of all of the other mainstream parties. The voters cannot be
distinguished from the voters of the other mainstream parties on the grid-dimension and the
gay rights-issue, other than as a contrast with the Christian democratic voters. The results are
consistent with the binary results with the dichotomous dependent variable. By conducting a
multinomial logistic regression analysis we gained some additional insights as contrasts to the
other parties.
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5.3 Summary of the analyses
In this analysis chapter I have empirically tested the re-theorized theoretical framework of the
three-dimensional political space (Kitschelt 2012). I have presented the results from seven
Western European countries and tested if the three-dimensional framework is able to explain
the voting patterns of populist radical right voters better than the dominant two-dimensional
accounts.
The results indicate that the voting patterns of the populist radical right voters are different
on the three dimensions, and that group and grid should be separated. By using the three-
dimensional framework the analyses have capture important variation in how populist radical
right voters can be placed in the political space, as hypothesized by Kitschelt (2012).
The results have also demonstrated that we gain additional insight from including the gay
rights-variable in some cases, but not in all. The results have emphasized that these issues do not
belong together empirically. The next chapter will discuss these results further.
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6Discussion
In this final chapter I discuss the results presented in chapter five in a comparative perspective, as
well as answering the hypotheses presented in chapter two according to the research question. I
start by summing up some of the general impressions from the analysis chapter before comparing
the results from each country. I then begin to answer the hypotheses and the general research
question. In the final concluding remarks I present discussions of the contributions of this thesis,
as well as suggestions for future research.
6.1 Discussion of results
In this thesis I have operationalized and tested a new theory concerning the structure of the
political space in relations to populist radical right voters. I have done this by carefully selecting
variables from the European Social Survey 2012 according to the theories that was outlined in the
theory chapter. I then tested if the issues that I had chosen loaded on three different components
as was expected from the theoretical outline. This resulted in three indices and one separate issue.
The three indices representing the economic dimension called greed, the boundary drawing
dimension of law and order issues called grid, and the dimension concerning inclusion and
exclusion of immigration and ethnic minorities, called group, as well as the separate issue of gay
rights. The indices and the gay rights-issue was again tested by using binary logistic regression
analysis to see if populist radical right voters was significantly different on the three dimensions
when compared to all other voters. I then tested if voters of populist radical right parties in
seven contemporary Western European democracies could be distinguished from voters of other
mainstream parties of the left and right, and how the populist radical right voters could be placed
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on the three dimensions in each country.
The general impression from the regression results with a dichotomous dependent variable,
grouping all seven countries into one analysis, is that group is the most important dimension
for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting. This is consistent with the general
impression of most research done on the topic (Ivarsflaten 2008; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2008).
The second impression from these results is that the gay rights-issue is the second most important
factor for mobilizing voters to the populist radical right in Western Europe. This is an unexpected
result both in relations to the theoretical framework, and in relations to the issue not belonging
to the grid-dimension. The third finding from the binary logistic regression model is that the
greed-dimension and the grid-dimension is not statistically significant, and has in this way
no effect on populist radical right voting. I also argued why it is important to test the three
dimensions along with the gay rights-issue, comparing populist radical right voters with the
voters of the other mainstream parties, by conducting cross-country voting analysis.
The analysis done by country revealed both expected and surprising results. As for the binary
model, all countries had negative and statistically significant coefficients for the group-index,
confirming that the group-issue is of substantial importance in mobilizing voters for the populist
radical right in Western Europe, compared to all other mainstream parties, as well as non-voters.
In comparing all the models representing the seven countries it is clear that group is a defining
feature of the populist radical right voters, which has been emphasized by many scholars (Mudde
2007; Rydgren 2008; Ivarsflaten 2008). The findings from this thesis, conducted with new data,
support previous research arguing that an exclusive and nativist appeal is important for populist
radical right voting.
The second clear finding that I would like to emphasize is the findings for the greed-index.
As many scholars have stated, populist radical right parties and voters are to the right on the
economic greed-dimension supportive of more market-liberal values. Kitschelt and McGann
(1995) argued that market-liberal values of being to the right on the economic dimension was
part of the winning formula for populist radical right parties together with exclusionist and
authoritarian values on immigration-issues and law and order-issues. In later work, he argued
that the placement of parties and voters on the economic dimension is something that could (and
should) vary over time and across countries (Kitschelt 2007). As argued by Ivarsflaten (2005),
voters do not necessarily need to be as far to the right as Kitschelt has argued. The findings
from this thesis supports Kitschelt (2007) and Ivarsflaten (2005). In the multinomial logistic
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regression models representing the seven countries, voters can be placed both to the far right
(Switzerland) and to the centre. Flanders is the only case where the greed-dimension is not
significant when compared to any of the other parties.
The findings for the grid-dimension as well as the gay rights-issue deserves more room
and discussion than the greed and group-dimension which are already well embedded in the
academic literature. As already mentioned, it is interesting that we do not have more research on
the subject of gay rights as it is a topic that is well argued for by party leaders in the media, at
least in the recent period of time (Morris 2014). As found in the analysis chapter, both the gay
rights-issue and the grid-dimension have the most varied results between countries. The results
indicate that the populist radical right voters in Western Europe can be placed both to the left
(more libertarian) and to the right (more authoritarian) than the other mainstream parties. The
next section will discuss the results and the theories according to each of the three dimensions
and answer the hypotheses.
6.2 Answering the hypotheses
In this section I answer my hypotheses. I answer each of them by discussing them comparatively
based on the results from each of the seven countries. I start by discussing the results for H1
which was compiled based on the greed-dimension. I then discuss the results for H2 that was
compiled based on the group-dimension. Finally I discuss the results for H3 that was compiled
based on the grid-dimension.
H1: The greed-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right
voting.
There is broad scholarly agreement of the importance of the economic dimension for the
supply by parties and the demand by voters in Western Europe. Concerning populist radical
right parties and voters, Kitschelt and McGann (1995) embedded the economic issues in their
famous winning formula. Betz (1994) also argued that economic issues was of importance for the
supply and demand of populist radical right parties. More recent research did not find economic
issues to be of importance for populist radical right voting (Carter 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005; Mudde
2007). In later research, Kitschelt has argued that economic preferences and issues might be of
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secondary importance and that such factors could and should vary over time and across countries
(Kitschelt 2007 2012).
The results from this thesis supports the more recent research in respect to several aspects.
The results from the straight comparative voting analysis clearly demonstrate that the economic
greed-dimension does not have any effect on the probability of voting for the populist radical
right when compared to the other voters in Western Europe. Relating to the straight comparative
voting analysis alone, the greed-dimension is not necessary for explaining the pattern of populist
radical right voting. When breaking up the analysis in different countries a more nuanced picture
emerges. The populist radical right voters in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark can clearly
be placed at the centre of the greed-dimension, while the populist radical right voters in Norway
and Finland are not distinct from the voters of the mainstream parties, except when compared to
the conservative voters where they are placed to the left. In Flanders, the greed-dimension had
no effect at all and the VB-voters could not be distinguished from the voters of any of the other
major parties. Only in Switzerland are populist radical right voters to the right of the voters of the
other major parties, except when compared to the liberals in which they cannot be distinguished
from.
The voters can, in all cases except for Switzerland, be placed at the centre of the economic
greed-dimension when compared to the other mainstream parties of the left and right, or not
be distinguished from the voters of the other major parties. The voters of the conservative
parties are overall better in mobilizing voters who hold market-liberal attitudes at the economic
greed-dimension. Switzerland and Flanders are two special cases regarding the economic greed-
dimension in each direction. The results from the Swiss case supports Betz (1994) and Kitschelt
and McGann (1995) in that economic issues are important in explaining the pattern of populist
radical right voting. In this analysis Switzerland may in fact be a prime example of Kitschelt’s
winning formula. Flanders on the other hand does not have a significant greed-index when the
populist radical right voters are compared to the voters of any of the other mainstream parties.
The effect of the greed-dimension is clearly strongest in the Swiss case and completely absent in
the Flemish case. The greed-dimension reveals interesting cross-country differences as expected
by Kitschelt (2007). the dimension cannot be merged with any of the other dimensions and
should remain separated as an independent economic dimension. The overall results from this
thesis supports H1 in that the greed-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist
radical right voting, although it is not necessary in every case that has been examined. It also
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supports Kitschelt (2007; 2012) in that the impact on economic issues can deviate depending on
what countries are included in the analysis, and that the populist radical right voters, with the
exception of Swiss voters, are not to the far-right on the economic greed-dimension, but rather at
the centre.
H2: The group-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right
voting.
The findings in this thesis supports what we already know: issues connected to inclusion
or exclusion of certain groups are of substantial importance for populist radical right voting.
All successful populist radical right parties have used a rhetoric supportive of the true nation
and excluding the influence of immigrants or ethnic minority groups (Betz 2002; 2003). The
early results from the straight comparative voting analysis demonstrated a clear pattern for
the group-dimension. The populist radical right parties in Western Europe are the dominant
choice for voters who hold exclusionary attitudes on the group-dimension. The findings from the
straight comparative voting analysis are supported and intensified when breaking up the analysis
into different countries.
The findings from the multinomial models representing all of the seven countries demon-
strated that populist radical right voters in Western Europe can be placed to the right of the
voters of all the other major parties on the group-dimension. The findings support the minimum
definition presented by Mudde (2007) where populist radical right parties to the least need to
have a nativist rhetoric. Although the multinomial models presented in the analysis chapter
reveal some differences among the populist radical right voters in the seven Western European
countries, the results for the group-dimension is consistent both within and between countries.
The group-index has the strongest coefficient in every case that has been presented in this thesis.
It is clear that the group-dimension is the most important for mobilizing voters to vote for the
populist radical right in contemporary Western European democracies. It cannot be merged with
any of the other dimensions and should be treated as a separate dimension in future research.
The results presented in the analysis chapter emphasize that the group-dimension is necessary
for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting in all the seven countries examined.
The results therefore supports H2: the group-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of
populist radical right voting.
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H3: The grid-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right
voting.
Relating to the straight comparative voting analysis alone, the grid-dimension is not necessary
for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting. In the binary analysis it was not able to
distinguish the populist radical right voters from the voters of the other parties. When conducting
the separate cross-country analysis, a more nuanced picture emerged, both for the grid-dimension
and for the gay right-issue. In some countries grid is not necessary for explaining the pattern of
populist radical right voting while it is necessary in other countries. In some countries we gained
important additional insight by including the gay rights-issue, while in other countries we did
not. Most importantly, the results have demonstrated that the grid-dimension cannot be merged
with any of the other dimensions and that it should remain separated in future research.
The concept of the grid-dimension represents the same issues as the well established
libertarian–authoritarian dimension but without the group-issue. In this thesis, issues repre-
senting security, tradition, strong state and the importance of following rules were included
in an index. One of the central issues for re-theorizing the political space was excluded from
the grid-index because it did not load as expected in the principal components analysis. In the
following paragraphs, I point out the instances where we gained important analytical leverage
from separating group and grid, as well as pointing out the cases where we gained important
additional insight from including the gay rights-issue 1.
Norway, Denmark and Sweden were the three cases that did not have a significant result for
the grid-dimension. The results demonstrated that the populist radical right voters in Scandinavia
are widely scattered across the grid-dimension. The insignificant results gave us important
analytical leverage for separating group and grid and demonstrated that while group is necessary
for explaining the populist radical right voting patterns, the grid-dimension is not. However, in
Sweden and Denmark we gained important additional insight from including the gay rights-issue
in the model. In these two cases, the gay rights-issue is necessary for explaining the pattern
of populist radical right voting, while in the Norwegian case it only serves as a contrast when
compared to the Christian democratic voters. The results have demonstrated that empirically, the
gay rights-issue does not belong together with grid.
1To increase the reliability of the results presented in the analysis chapter, I have run the multinomial models
for each country one time without the grid-index and one time without the gay rights-variable. The results do not
change in any way worthy of mentioning.
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Finland represents a special case. The PS-voters can be placed at the centre of the grid-
dimension, being both to the left of, and to the right of, some of the other mainstream voters. The
results from the Finnish case give important analytical leverage for separating group and grid.
The voting patterns of the PS-voters moved in another direction than the voting patterns in the
group-dimension. In addition, we gained additional insight from including the gay rights-issue
in the model. The results from the Finnish case demonstrate that the gay rights-issue is different
from the grid-dimension. This was emphasized when the PS-voters were compared to the social
democratic SAP-voters, in which the PS-voters could be placed to the left of the SAP-voters
on the grid-dimension, but to the right of the SAP-voters on the gay rights-issue. In Finland,
the grid-dimension plays a bigger part, and also in opposite direction than the group-dimension.
In Finland, the grid-dimension is clearly necessary to explain the populist radical right voting
pattern.
The results for the Swiss case are exceptional. The results presented clear voting patterns
for all the three dimensions. The SVP-voters are to the right of the other voters on the greed-
dimension, to the right of the other voters on the group-dimension, and to the right of the other
voters on the grid-dimension. As for the previous cases, the Swiss voters are only to the right
of all the other voters on the group-dimension. The Swiss case also gives important analytical
leverage for separating group and grid, but the two dimensions do not have different directions,
as in the Finnish case. The SVP-voters are to the right of the mainstream parties of the left,
but not distinct from the major parties of the right on the grid-dimension. Opposite from the
Nordic cases, we do not gain additional analytical insight by including the gay rights-issue in the
regression model.
In Flanders, the results demonstrated that we gain important analytical leverage from separat-
ing group and grid. The results also demonstrated that we did not gain any additional insight
from including the gay rights-issue in the model. In the Flemish case, the VB-voters were
to the right of the voters of all the other major parties on the group-dimension, but could not
be distinguished from the voters of the other major parties on any of the other dimensions.
The results demonstrate the importance of separating group and grid, but does not support the
inclusion of the gay rights-issue as a separate issue in the Flemish case.
As for the six previous cases, the results from the Dutch case also demonstrate that we gain
important analytical leverage by separating group and grid. As for the other cases, the Dutch
PVV-voters can be placed to the right of the voters of all the other major parties. The results
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demonstrate that the PVV-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other mainstream
parties, other than as a contrast towards the Christian democratic voters. Including the gay
rights-issue does not explain more of the voting pattern of the PVV than if it had been excluded
from the analysis.
Comparatively, the grid-dimension plays a minor part in explaining the pattern of populist
radical right voting. What my results demonstrate, is that it has been misleading to include grid-
and group-values as belonging to one dimension. The results strongly suggest that these issues
should be separated. In some cases the grid-values also play the opposite part of the group-values.
The two dimensions cannot be merged and does not belong together. However, depending on
how one defines the grid-dimension, the gay rights-issue needs to be taken into account. In
some cases the gay rights-issue explain the pattern of populist radical right voting better than
the grid-dimension. I have, throughout this entire thesis, treated these issues as belonging to the
same concept moving from a libertarian versus authoritarian pole. Based on the results from the
principal components analysis, I separated them in the regression analysis. The regression results
demonstrated that we gain important additional insight from including the gay rights-issue in the
Nordic countries, while we do not gain any additional insight by including the gay right-issue in
Flanders, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The grid-dimension and the gay rights-issue reveal
interesting cross-country differences. Based on the above mentioned elaboration, the results
support H3: the grid-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right
voting. However, the results also demonstrate that more research is needed on the topic.
6.3 Conclusion
The goal of this thesis has been to operationalize the issues constituting the three-dimensional
political space, and to test if the issues included in the three dimensions are able to distinguish
the voters of populist radical right parties from the voters of the other mainstream parties in
contemporary Western European democracies. It all started with Kitschelt’s re-theorization of
the political space that was inspired by the liberal and exclusionary populist radical right party
leader Pim Fortuyn (Kitschelt 2012). To choose variables from the European Social Survey 2012
to operationalize the issues representing the three dimensions I used both classical theories and
newer theories, concerning both the dimensionality of the political space as well as populist
radical right parties and their electorate. Surprisingly, the first finding was that a central issue
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concerning gay rights did not belong to any of the three dimensions that I had operationalized.
The further analysis, using binary logistic regression analysis and multinomial logistic regression
analysis, demonstrated that the gay rights-issue is a central issue for distinguishing populist
radical right voters from other voters in some countries, and that this cannot be explained by the
three dimensions.
This conclusion has two parts. In the first part I summarize the most important findings
and give an overview of the populist radical right voting patterns in Western Europe, as well as
give an answer to the general research question. In the next section I argue how and why these
findings are important for the research of populist radical right parties and give some suggestions
for future research.
6.3.1 The three-dimensional political space
Kitschelt (2012) re-theorized the structure of the political space constituting populist radical right
parties and voters. He argued that the classical two-dimensional framework was not enough to
explain the success of the populist radical right parties after the major breakthrough of Lijst Pim
Fortuyn in the 2002 national election. In this thesis I have operationalized the new theoretical
framework and tested it according to the populist radical right voters in Western Europe. This
thesis supports Kitschelt’s re-theorization of the political space. The results discovered both
country differences and similarities and support what we already know: issues connected to
group and greed are important. The country differences are largest on the grid-dimension and
on the gay rights-issue. The separation of group and grid as suggested by Kitschelt (2012)
demonstrate that previous research might have emphasized authoritarian grid-issues as more
important than they really are. The results from this thesis demonstrated that the grid-dimension
only had an important impact in explaining the populist radical right voting pattern in some of
the cases, and in some cases also in different directions.
The overall research question of this thesis is the following: can the new three-dimensional
political space outlined by Kitschelt in recent work, better explain populist radical right voting
patterns than the existing and dominant two-dimensional frameworks? Table 6.1 and 6.2 below
summarize the results from the multinomial logistic regression analyses and place the populist
radical right voters from each country in the political space to graphically present the voting
patterns. Table 6.1 summarizes the results of greed and group, while table 6.2 summarizes the
results of grid and gay rights.
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Table 6.1: Mapping the results for greed and group
Greed
– – – = + + +
– –
–
=
G
ro
up
+
+ +
Denmark
Norway Sweden Switzerland
Finland Flanders
The Netherlands
Table 6.1 summarizes what we already know from previous research, populist radical right
voters hold exclusionary attitudes towards immigration and EU-issues on the group-dimension
and can be placed to the right of all other voters on these issues (Ivarsflaten 2008; Rydgren 2008;
Mudde 2007). The majority of the voters can also be placed at the centre of the greed-dimension.
The exceptions are Norway, Finland and Switzerland. The Norwegian and Finnish PRR-voters
are to the left of some of the other major parties, but not distinguishable from all of them, while
the Swiss PRR-voters are to the right of the majority of the other voters, but not distinguishable
from the liberal voters. Table 6.1 summarizes issues from the dominant two-dimensional account,
but without the grid-issues. The table demonstrates very clearly that issues constituting group
are the dominant issues constructing the voting pattern of populist radical right voters, where
these voters can be placed to the far-right.
Table 6.2 summarizes the results of the grid-dimension and the gay rights-issue. The
table maps the voting patterns of the populist radical right voters based on the results for each
country. The table reveals interesting cross-country differences and emphasize the importance of
conducting cross-country research when examining populist radical right voters and dimensions
in the political space.
The varying results found for the grid-dimension and the gay rights-issue supports Kitschelt’s
argument for re-theorizing the structure of the political space. Libertarian versus authoritarian
issues do not belong together with the inclusive versus exclusive group-issues. More importantly,
the results indicate that voters of the populist radical right can be both libertarian and authoritarian
on both grid and gay rights-issues. These results support Kitschelt (2012) in that populist radical
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Table 6.2: Mapping the results for grid and gay rights
Gay rights
– – – = + + +
– –
– The Netherlands
= Norway Finland
G
ri
d
Denmark
Sweden
+
Flanders Switzerland
+ +
right voters can differ on the grid-dimension when conducting cross-country research. The results
mapped in table 6.2 are important in answering the research question. The three-dimensional
account outlined by Kitschelt (2012), does in fact explain the pattern of populist radical right
voting better than the existing and dominant two-dimensional accounts. There are many reasons
for this. First of all, the three-dimensional framework reveals that the group-dimension alone
is the most important for explaining the populist radical right voting pattern. In doing this, the
framework is able to demonstrate that previous research may have given grid-values too much
attention. This is emphasized by the importance of the group-values and the varying grid-values.
Strong results for group could have camouflaged grid-values as significant in previous research.
Secondly, the three-dimensional framework is able to reveal important cross-country differences
for the grid-dimension. In Switzerland, the result is as expected from previous research, but
in the other six cases it is not. These findings support the separation of group and grid. The
attitudes structuring the two dimensions are different, and they cannot be merged with any of the
other dimensions.
Kitschelt’s (2012) account of the three-dimensional political space in Western Europe is,
however, not fully embraced by the evidence presented in this thesis. The results presented in this
thesis discovered the presence of an important secondary issue that does not fit into Kitschelt’s
three-dimensional framework; the gay rights-issue. Empirically the gay rights-issue does not
belong together with the grid-dimension. In some cases the issue is important in explaining the
populist radical right voting pattern. This emphasizes the importance of more research on this
topic.
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6.3.2 Contributions and future research
This thesis has two main contributions. First of all I have operationalized the issues belonging
to the three dimensions. This operationalization was based on thorough review of both classic
and newer theories regarding political dimensions and the populist radical right. I also used the
cultural theories of grid and group as suggested by Kitschelt (2007 2012). The theories were
then applied to find the best suiting variables from the European Social Survey 2012 to represent
the values constituting the three-dimensional political space.
The second contribution of this thesis is the empirical testing of this exact theoretical
framework. Kitschelt (2012) introduced a re-theorized theoretical framework consisting of three
dimensions to distinguish voters of the populist radical right. The framework has never before
been empirically tested. The results indicate that the populist radical right voting patterns are
different on these three dimensions, and that group and grid should be separated. By using three
dimensions this thesis was able to capture important variation in how populist radical right voters
can be placed in the political space, as hypothesised by Kitschelt (2012).
This thesis has discovered the presence of an important issue that does not fit into the three-
dimensional political framework. The gay rights-issue represents values that are different from
the ones constituting the grid-dimension. Neither Kitschelt nor I could have expected these
results. Something is happening in Western Europe in regards to the values constituting grid and
the issue of gay rights. Empirically these issues do not belong together. The results make it clear
that there has been done far too little research on populist radical right voting and gay rights.
This should be explored further in future research.
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Appendix
Table 3: Main content of the variables structuring the three-dimensional political space
Greed
Income redistribution Important for democracy that the government takes measures to reduce differences in
income levels
Economic protection Important for democracy that the government protects all citizens against poverty
Group
European Union Thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further.
Others say it has already gone too far. What number on the scale best describes your
position?
Quality of life Is [Country] made a worse or better place to live by people coming to live here from
other countries?
Cultural threat Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by
people coming to live here from other countries
Multiculturalism Allow many/few people of a different race or ethnic group as most [country]’s people
to come and live here
Grid
Gay rights Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.
Tradition It is important to follow the traditions and customs handed down by religion or family.
Security It is important to live in secure surroundings and to avoid anything that might endanger
safety.
Strong state It is important that the government ensures safety against all threats. She/he wants the
state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.
Follow rules People should do what they’re told and follow rules at all times, even when no-one is
watching.
Table 4: Frequencies of observations by country
Country Frequency Percent
Flanders 1271 10.66
Switzerland 1493 12.52
Denmark 1650 13.83
Finland 2197 18.42
The Netherlands 1845 15.47
Norway 1624 13.62
Sweden 1847 15.49
Total 11927 100.00
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Table 5: Correlation between variables
income econom europe quality culture multic gay tradit Secure Strong Rules
Income 1.0000
Econom 0.5115 1.0000
Europe -0.0434 0.0019 1.0000
Quality 0.0894 0.1050 0.2980 1.0000
Culture 0.1156 0.0921 0.2581 0.6380 1.0000
Multic 0.0606 0.0821 0.2323 0.5152 0.4776 1.0000
Gay -0.0138 0.0421 0.1278 0.1816 0.1848 0.2208 1.0000
Tradit -0.0684 -0.0566 0.0190 0.0977 0.1276 0.1383 0.1592 1.0000
Secure -0.1099 -0.0766 0.0685 0.1327 0.1136 0.1653 0.1149 0.2513 1.0000
Strong -0.1770 -0.1944 0.0400 0.1010 0.0860 0.1206 0.0860 0.2365 0.3544 1.0000
Rules -0.0230 -0.0339 0.0071 0.0944 0.1275 0.1134 0.1343 0.2618 0.2576 0.2638 1.0000
Table 6: Index of greed
Income redistribution
Economic protection
Chronbach’s alpha 0.660
Table 7: Index of group
European Union
Quality of life
Cultural threat
Multiculturalism
Chronbach’s alpha 0.674
Table 8: Index of grid
Tradition
Security
Strong state
Follow rules
Chronbach’s alpha 0.597
Table 9: Testing the indices: Norway
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Greed .427 -.062
(.529) (.592)
Group 6.09*** 6.34***
(.650) (.690)
Grid .592 -.414
(.542) (.606)
Gay rights .618 -.369
(.382) (.437)
Constant -2.15*** -5.12*** -2.44*** -2.20*** -4.89***
(.142) (.370) (.362) (.130) (.508)
N=1112
LR Chi2 0.64 100.96*** 1.20 2.50 102.30***
Pseudo R2 0.0008 0.1291 0.0015 0.0032 0.1309
AIC 785.15 684.82 784.58 783.28 689.48
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 10: Testing the indices: Denmark
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Greed .692 -.249
(.515) (.585)
Group 6.62*** 6.52***
(.612) (.640)
Grid 1.57** -.014
(.611) (.691)
Gay rights 1.74*** .606
(.409) (.465)
Constant -2.51*** -5.66*** -3.38*** -2.62*** -5.63***
(.165) (.372) (.423) (.128) (.565)
N=1206
LR Chi2 1.74 147.26*** 6.88** 15.83*** 149.04***
Pseudo R2 0.0024 0.2065 0.0097 0.0222 0.2090
AIC 715.46 569.95 710.32 701.37 574.17
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 11: Testing the indices: Sweden
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Greed .552 .489
(.740) (.845)
Group 8.90*** 8.89***
(.907) (.950)
Grid 1.40* -.673
(.730) (.870)
Gay rights 2.50*** 1.43*
(.567) (.663)
Constant -3.16*** -7.45*** -3.94*** -3.57*** -7.42***
(.188) (.550) (.486) (.196) (.747)
N=1308
LR Chi2 0.54 124.94*** 3.78* 17.28*** 130.37***
Pseudo R2 0.0011 0.2631 0.0080 0.0364 0.2746
AIC 478.28 353.87 475.04 461.53 354.45
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 12: Testing the indices: Finland
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Greed -.674 -1.03
(.518) (.549)
Group 5.56*** 5.40***
(.549) (.582)
Grid .141 -.934
(.454) (.505)
Gay rights 1.37*** .503
(.270) (.306)
Constant -1.74*** -4.47*** -1.94*** -2.21*** -3.74***
(.113) (.291) (.308) (.112) (.431)
N=1433
LR Chi2 1.75 116.85*** 0.10 24.42*** 124.25***
Pseudo R2 0.0015 0.1028 0.0001 0.0215 0.1093
AIC 1138.58 1023.48 1140.23 1115.91 1022.08
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 13: Testing the indices: Switzerland
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Greed .827 1.01
(.550) (.612)
Group 5.66*** 5.11***
(.694) (.734)
Grid 3.63*** 2.66***
(.685) (.780)
Gay rights 1.06 -.170
(.391) (.465)
Constant -1.72*** -4.40*** -4.09*** -1.83*** -6.17***
(.157) (.391) (.510) (.151) (.676)
N=679
LR Chi2 2.22 79.53*** 31.72*** 7.08** 92.93***
Pseudo R2 0.0035 0.1262 0.0503 0.0112 0.1474
AIC 632.06 554.75 602.55 627.19 547.34
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 14: Testing the indices: Flanders
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Greed -.197 -.907
(.912) (.913)
Group 4.69*** 4.82***
(.832) (.860)
Grid .510 -.961
(.972) (1.03)
Gay rights .975 .588
(.567) (.604)
Constant -2.87*** -5.41*** -3.24*** -3.10*** -4.80***
(.227) (.523) (.663) (.197) (.807)
N=890
LR Chi2 0.05 32.48*** 0.28 2.67 34.62***
Pseudo R2 0.0001 0.0897 0.0008 0.0074 0.0956
AIC 366.09 333.65 365.85 363.47 337.51
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 15: Testing the indices: The Netherlands
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Greed .186 -.705
(.689) (.713)
Group 7.77*** 8.02***
(.737) (.751)
Grid .788 -.349
(.699) (.748)
Gay rights -.107 -1.18
(.615) (.668)
Constant -2.69*** -6.69*** -3.16*** -2.63*** -6.25***
(.201) (.454) (.477) (.135) (.658)
N=1303
LR Chi2 0.07 133.25*** 1.29 0.03 137.81
Pseudo R2 0.0001 0.2103 0.0020 0.0000 0.2175
AIC 637.63 504.45 636.41 637.67 505.89
***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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